Administrative Law Issues

Patents as Incomplete Contracts: Aligning Incentives for R&D Investment with Incentives to Disclose Prior Art

Authors: Jay P. Kesan (University of Illinois School of Law) , Marc Banik (Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM))

  • Patents as Incomplete Contracts: Aligning Incentives for R&D Investment with Incentives to Disclose Prior Art

    Administrative Law Issues

    Patents as Incomplete Contracts: Aligning Incentives for R&D Investment with Incentives to Disclose Prior Art

    Authors: ,

Options

Abstract

In this Article we propose that viewing patents as incomplete contracts is a useful means to analyze the relationship between legal institutions of patent enforcement and investment in R&D.

Keywords: Contracts, Incentives (Business), Industrial research, Patent law, Prior art (Patent law)

Downloads:
Download pdf
View PDF

Published on
2000-01-01

License

All rights reserved