
URBAN RENEWAL IN
DESOTO-CARR:
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
COMES OF AGE

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This is the story of urban renewal planning in the DeSoto-Carr neighborhood, a hard-core Negro slum in the St. Louis inner city. It is also the story of two federally-financed programs, urban renewal and Model Cities, whose differing guidelines and objectives clashed to provide a confrontation between official and citizen planning in what was certainly one of the first tests of the new citizen power in slum neighborhoods. But we must begin our story—at least its citizen participation part—as early as 1964. Although federal regulations had previously mandated citizen participation in renewal programs, it was with the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964—the War on Poverty—that citizen participation in the planning process became an overriding concern in a federally-supported program. This dramatic change was signalled by the requirement that community action programs be “developed, conducted and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members served.”¹ It was also in 1966 that Congress adopted the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, more commonly known as the Model Cities Act. As was true of the poverty program, the Act was a tool by which to launch a broad scale attack to improve the quality of urban life, and to uplift “persons of low income in older urban areas.”² Unlike the poverty program, however, which contem-

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1. 42 U.S.C. § 2782(3) (Supp. 1969).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 3301(Supp. 1969).

plated an independent poverty agency, Model Cities mandated that the local model city agency be within the local governmental structure.³ In what constitutes a statutory retreat from "maximum feasible participation," Congress also required that one prerequisite for assistance would be "widespread citizen participation" in the Model City program.⁴

Although the Model Cities legislation represented a retreat from the citizen participation requirement of the troubled poverty program, administrative guidelines interpreting the legislation did not adequately reflect the implicit change in Congressional policy. The basic guideline for citizen participation formulated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (hereinafter referred to as HUD) required the constructive involvement of citizens in model neighborhoods *and the city as a whole* and the creation of a means to introduce the views of area residents in policy making and to allow them to participate actively in planning and implementing the demonstration (Emphasis added.) HUD held that the requirement was an outgrowth of the conviction that improving the quality of life in model neighborhoods "could be accomplished *only by* affirmative action of the people themselves" (Emphasis added).⁵

Against the background of Congressional interest in effective citizen participation in Model Cities, federal urban renewal legislation has remained unchanged. It remained to HUD to formulate and require

3. 42 U.S.C. § 3312(2) (1966). In appearing before a Congressional subcommittee, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Robert Weaver stated that the proposed legislation required that programs would be subject to the control of the local governing body. *Hearings on H.R., 12341, H.R. 12946, H.R. 13064, H.R. 1256 Before the Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee on Banking and Currency*, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 36 (1966). The summary of the Act stresses the importance of the role of the city and, although it states that the demonstration programs must utilize private initiative and enterprise "to the fullest possible extent," it is devoid of verbiage requiring "widespread citizen participation" or "maximum feasible participation." *House Committee on Banking and Currency, Summary, Analysis, Legislative History and Conference Report, Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966*, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1-2 (1966).

4. 42 U.S.C. § 3303(a) (2) (Supp. 1969).

5. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (hereinafter cited as HUD), Model Cities Administration, City Demonstration Letter #3, Oct. 30, 1967.

Legitimate questions can be raised as to the meaning of these terms. Both the terms and the legislation within which they appear suggest a difference in approach. As has been postulated elsewhere, HUD's position on citizen participation is somewhat ambivalent.

the growth of citizen inputs. In June of 1968, HUD required formation of Project Area Committees comprised of area residents for all urban renewal projects which had projected residential redevelopment and which were not yet in the execution stage.⁶ The only exception to the creation of project committees was an urban renewal effort within a Model City neighborhood, to which Model Cities guidelines were to apply.

URBAN REDEVELOPMENT IN SAINT LOUIS

Both urban renewal and Model Cities guidelines were to be applied to the DeSoto-Carr area in Saint Louis. Located adjacent to the central business district and directly north of it, DeSoto-Carr has become the focal point of attack upon urban problems financed by federally aided programs—among them several employment projects, a community action program financed through the poverty program, an expressway underwritten in part by federal aid, an urban renewal project, and a Model Cities effort, the project boundary of which includes the urban renewal site. DeSoto-Carr also contains a substantial amount of federally-aided public housing.

Saint Louis itself is a core city of approximately 673,000 which has suffered the loss of over 250,000 whites within the past twenty years while experiencing a growth of non-white population from 154,000 in 1950 to 216,000 in 1960 to a projected 291,000 in 1970.⁷ Further, in the decade from 1953 to 1964, one-eighth of the manufacturing firms vacated the city and 26,100 jobs disappeared.⁸ Much of the exodus of the whites and of industry can be attributed to widespread physical deterioration which has accentuated the appeal of the suburbs that Saint Louis is constitutionally precluded from annexing.⁹ The effects of a physically deteriorated city upon its populace and the need to undertake drastic renovation was evident to the city's planners as early as 1942, at which time they isolated a collar of obsolete land users surrounding the central business district. This collar embraced 7.4% of the city. A blighted area requiring extensive rehabilitation totaled

6. HUD, Local Planning Letter #458, June 24, 1968. The letter has since been incorporated into the Urban Renewal Handbook at RHA 7217.1 Ch. 5, Sec. 2 (Feb. 1969).

7. SAINT LOUIS CITY PLANNING COMM'N (hereinafter cited as PLAN COMM'N), TECHNICAL REPORT ON BASIC INDICATORS at 2, 10-14 (Dec. 1968). One-tenth of the non-white populous in-migrated in the 1950's, but the non-white increase is due more to high birth rates than to migration. *Id.* at 12.

8. PLAN COMM'N, TECHNICAL REPORT ON INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT POTENTIALS 3, 6 (Dec. 1968).

9. MO. CONST. ART. VI, § 30.

27% of the city and surrounded this decadent collar.¹⁰ Since World War II, much of the core area has undergone, or is in the process of undergoing, urban renewal.

Another cornerstone of Saint Louis' redevelopment plans has been to increase accessibility to the city's core.¹¹ A comprehensive plan in 1947 proposed three types of highways, expressways, distributors, and radials, to meet this need.¹² The radials were to connect the city core and the outlying areas while the north-south routes were to distribute the traffic. Expressways were to allow access to the city as well as to furnish a means to avoid the central city congestion. The solution proposed in 1947 was challenged¹³ but rebutted in 1951,¹⁴ again recommended in 1959,¹⁵ and officially made part of the "Major Streets" map in 1961. As of 1969, all but one of the completed highways have been financed as part of the federally-aided interstate system,¹⁶ in which the federal government pays 90 per cent of construction costs. Highway plans which have not received federal assistance have not proceeded beyond the proposal state. Such is the status of the northwest radial, whose eastern terminus is projected to pass through DeSoto-Carr.¹⁷

Federal funding also affected renewal efforts in DeSoto-Carr. Prior to 1947, the only large-scale renewal effort in DeSoto-Carr had been construction of a low-rise public housing complex financed under the Housing Act of 1937.¹⁸ As of 1947, the only available federal assistance

10. PLAN COMM'N, SAINT LOUIS AFTER WORLD WAR II 18 (1942).

11. PLAN COMM'N COMPREHENSIVE CITY PLAN FOR ST. LOUIS, vol. 1, (1947); Interview with Ronald Neutzel, Acting Director of City Plan Comm'n, Oct. 31, 1968.

12. COMPREHENSIVE CITY PLAN, *supra* note 11, at 35-38.

13. SAINT LOUIS URBAN AREA EXPRESSWAY REPORT PROJECT, EXPRESSWAY PLAN FOR SAINT LOUIS AND ADJACENT MISSOURI AREA at 8-12, 17-34 (1951).

14. PLAN COMM'N., RELATIONSHIP OF THE SAINT LOUIS URBAN EXPRESSWAY PLAN TO THE OFFICIAL MAJOR STREET PLAN (1952).

15. MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION, A HIGHWAY PLANNING STUDY FOR THE SAINT LOUIS METROPOLITAN AREA, vol. 1 195-200 (1959).

16. The federal aid highway legislation is found at 23 U.S.C. § 101 *et seq.* (1966). Ninety percent of the cost of the interstate system is payable by the federal government. 23 U.S.C. § 120(c) (1966).

17. Although several attempts have been made to place the northwest radial in the state system, budgetary restrictions have precluded its designation as a route eligible for State and Federal aid. Interview with Thomas Dollus, State Highway Commission Official, March 19, 1969.

18. 42 U.S.C. § 1401, *et seq.* (1966).

was for low-rent public housing, and a redevelopment proposal at the time proposed rehousing in a series of low-rise apartments similar to the public housing already existing. Commercial enterprises serving the residents were to be located in planned shop clusters.¹⁹

By the 1950's federal aid was available for redeveloping residential slums with industrial uses. A study in 1953 suggested industrial rather than residential uses in much of the area, and a city-wide Land Use Plan in 1957 again projected industrial redevelopment.²⁰

Missouri's slum clearance law was passed in 1951, and a local land clearance authority was created soon thereafter, to be referred to in this discussion as LCA. Had urban renewal proceeded in 1957, the LCA would quietly have gone ahead with plans for industrial redevelopment with little or no citizen involvement in renewal plans. But renewal was delayed in the DeSoto-Carr area, and the legal framework for renewal had changed.

II. THE PROJECT AREA IN 1968

In 1947, the DeSoto-Carr neighborhoods were predominantly residential and had approximately 5,000 dwellings. Fully sixty to seventy per cent were without toilets.²¹ The neighborhoods were overwhelmingly obsolete. Since that date, and most notably since 1960, the present project area has suffered a rapid decline in population. In 1960, 3,036 units housed 7,767 people while only 1,383 people occupied 492 dwellings in 1968.²² Of the 3,036 occupied dwellings in 1960, over ninety per cent were substandard.²³

In addition to the earlier low-rise housing project in the area, five new, predominantly high-rise public housing projects were built in the area at a cost of fifty-five million dollars between 1953 and 1957.²⁴ Four of the projects were directly west of the urban renewal area and the fifth was on the eastern boundary.²⁵ By 1960, the population in

19. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, *supra* note 11, at 28-30.

20. PLAN COMM'N, LAND USE PLAN at 31 (1956).

21. COMPREHENSIVE CITY PLAN, *supra* note 11.

22. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF METROPOLITAN SAINT LOUIS, ACTION/HOUSING DEP'T 22 (1968) (hereinafter cited as ACTION/HOUSING).

23. LAND CLEARANCE FOR REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANNING ANALYSIS FOR DESOTO CARR URBAN RENEWAL AREA 35 (1968) (hereinafter cited as HOFFMAN REPORT).

24. All of the public housing in St. Louis is concentrated in the "slum collar."

25. WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY URBAN RESEARCH AND DESIGN CENTER, CHECKLIST OF SLUM CLEARANCE, PUBLIC HOUSING, URBAN RENEWAL, REHABILITATION AND CONSERVATION PROJECTS IN THE ST. LOUIS METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA 5-6 (Nov. 7, 1966).

the projects fostered a new set of problems, which, even without the expansion of citizen participation, created complications in the planning and execution of a redevelopment program.

The presence of the projects has triggered a social deterioration in the area and has created an adverse impression in the minds of the general community so that it is thought to be, and is, a high crime, low income, black ghetto. By 1967, the urban renewal area was between densely populated pockets of federally-aided housing projects. 18,400 people, sixty-eight per cent of whom were under age twenty-one, lived in project housing households which had a median income of \$2,504. Sixty-three per cent of the households were without a male head, fifty-eight per cent were receiving welfare and fully ninety-eight per cent were non-white.²⁶ The social stigma of the housing projects has resulted in increasing difficulties in obtaining tenants, high vacancy rates, and several social problems which have become a national scandal.²⁷ The projects have also caused concern that attracting new business and industry, which could aid in the solution of the social problems of the area, would be more than usually difficult. By 1968 then, the planning for the redevelopment of the 374 acre tract,²⁸ occupied by a random mixture of incompatible residential, commercial and industrial users, would have to consider the needs and effects of the surrounding negative social patterns.

III. AGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE PROJECT AREA

Three other developments occurred between 1960 and 1968 which directly affect planning for the area. All are direct offspring of federal legislation. As a preliminary to detailed urban renewal planning, federal legislation provides funding for a General Neighborhood Renewal Plan (hereinafter GNRP).²⁹ The function of a GNRP is to

26. HOFFMAN REPORT, *supra* note 24, at 40-42.

27. The average vacancy rate in 1960 was 10.7% while it was 17% in 1968. In one project the vacancy rate is 26-30%. Hoffman Report, *supra* note 24, at 39. The rate is especially high as the need for low rent housing in Saint Louis is extremely acute.

28. The uses in the present tract are as follows: 41.2% (154.2 acres) is devoted to streets and highways; 22.4% of the remainder to commercial (49.2 acres); 36.1% (79.4 acres) to industrial; 13.6% (29.9 acres) to off-street parking; 9.4% (20.8 acres) to public use; 8.7% (19.4 acres) to residential use and 9.8% (21.6 acres) is vacant. Non-street uses comprise 58.8% of the land, so the project has 220.3 net acres. HOFFMAN REPORT, *supra* note 24, at 20.

29. 42 U.S.C. § 1452(d) (1966).

undertake preliminary planning of an area in need of urban renewal but too large to be effectively redeveloped through but one urban renewal project. The Federal government funded such a study for Saint Louis in the early 1960's which covered the same area as the present Model Cities target area. At that time the changing character of the DeSoto-Carr area was reflected by GNRP proposals for an increase in residential uses over what was recommended in the 1957 city plan. Much of the residential redevelopment projected by the GNRP study was high-rise public housing.³⁰

A second major development was the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, which has already been noted. Through the funds made available by that Act, community organization in the five housing projects and in the urban renewal area began to develop. The poverty program in Saint Louis was and is managed through the Saint Louis Human Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as HDC). HDC divided its target areas into districts, two of which were within the DeSoto-Carr urban renewal area.³¹ HDC funded two settlement houses in the Carr Central area as neighborhood stations.³² When preliminary planning for urban renewal began, residents of the urban renewal area sought the aid of a staff member in one of the settlement houses to assist in organizing yet another citizens' body which came to be the Carr Central Tenement Improvement Association. These people were exclusively from the urban renewal area.³³ This split in citizen organization between the public housing and urban renewal areas was to continue to bedevil project planning.

Grass roots organizations therefore existed by the time Saint Louis launched the Model City program in 1966. The approach of the Model City agency was to look at the ghetto as possessing a series of component "subsystem" problems. These subsystems corresponded to the items listed as part of the comprehensive approach in the Congressional Act itself—housing, employment, welfare, education, health,

30. Interview with Albert Nerviani, DeSoto-Carr Urban Renewal Project Director, March 13, 1969.

31. Carr Central is in the eastern portion of the DeSoto-Carr urban renewal area; the second HDC district is named Pruitt-Igoe and includes the western portion of the urban renewal site.

32. All references to Carr-Central, Pruitt-Igoe or the neighborhood refer to HDC-Model Cities groups: all references to DeSoto-Carr refer to LCA and the urban renewal project.

33. ACTION/HOUSING, *supra* note 23, at 19-21. Interview with Rev. Buck Jones, Staff Member of Plymouth House, Nov. 13, 1968.

crime and delinquency, recreation, culture and transportation.³⁴ The concept was that there were either insufficient programs in the neighborhood or misdirected ones. Once these inadequacies could be isolated, new programs could be designed to "fill the gaps." By changing programs or introducing new ones, and then assessing their effects on the system of the ghetto through deductive theory, the area could be uplifted. The Model City Agency thus saw itself as a planning agency and a tool for coordinating and improving upon the disparate programs then available to ghetto residents.³⁵

The target area for the Model City effort originally encompassed much of the northern half of the city, but was reduced in area to form a semi-circle around the central business district roughly similar to the slum collar first identified in 1942. This target area was later reduced at the behest of the federal government to include 70,000 people on the north side of the central business district where it was felt the worst social conditions existed.³⁶ Because of the geographic and demographic scale of the target area and an overriding desire to achieve a high citizen input, the target area was next divided into five "sub-cities" or "sub-neighborhoods."

HUD's performance standards for citizen participation required that an organizational structure be formed which would embody neighborhood residents and be led by a person whom the neighborhood would accept as representing their interests. In the same letter that outlined citizen participation for Model City efforts, HUD mandated that the citizen structure

"... have clear and direct access to the decision making process of the *City Demonstration Agency* so that neighborhood views can influence policy planning and program decisions" (emphasis added).³⁷

In promulgating performance standards then, HUD did imply citizens were to have power, but the question of whether they would control programs is unanswered.

34. 42 U.S.C. § 3301 (1969 Supp.).

35. B. Phegan, *The Development of the Saint Louis Model City Agency from June 1966 to April 1967, 6-9, 1968* (unpublished thesis in the Washington University Art and Architectural Library).

36. Interview with Samuel Dardick, former Chief Planner of Saint Louis Model City Agency, March 12, 1969.

37. *City Demonstration Letter #3, supra* note 5.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION COMES OF AGE

As stated, the boundaries of the Model Cities neighborhoods were to be divided by five, the better to achieve a high citizen input. Although this objective was achieved, the effect of the sub-city system was to inhibit the growth of an organized and comprehensive plan and to pit one sub-neighborhood against another. The end result was the creation of five Model City plans rather than one.

Integration of the five sub-neighborhood plans was to occur through a "floating" sub-city team acting as a liaison among the five sub-neighborhood groups. Integration of the Model City effort with other agencies was the responsibility of the "sub-system" planning committee, which was to achieve and maintain contact with agencies which were or should be operating in the target area. These integrative steps were not to occur and planning in the sub-cities was to proceed without the coordination necessary to evolve one complete and related program.

Within each of the five neighborhoods, the Model Cities agency planned to recognize an indigenous group which was or could become representative of the entire sub-neighborhood. Once a group received recognition, it was to form a non-profit corporation, after which both HDC and the Model Cities agencies were to orient their activities to and through the recognized corporation.³⁸

Model Cities recognized two groups in the DeSoto-Carr urban renewal area. One was the group which had been nurtured by the HDC from a group of tenant councils into a neighborhood advisory council. Upon Model City recognition, it formed the Carr Central Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Carr Central). A similar corporation, another outgrowth of HDC activity, was formed in Pruitt-Igoe. The former occupied much of the urban renewal area while the latter represented the people in the western sector of DeSoto-Carr. The Carr Central Tenement Improvement Association was not recognized, evidently as it did not have the necessary neighborhood support.

Admittedly, Model Cities did give consideration to conforming neighborhood boundaries with that of the pre-existing urban renewal area. At one time, the Model City and urban renewal boundaries did coincide.³⁹ However, the conviction that high citizen input was rela-

38. Saint Louis City Demonstration Agency, *Citizen Participation*, 3 (January 12, 1968) (hereinafter cited as *Citizen Participation*).

39. HDC, *Research and Planning Document #5, Neighborhood Handbook for Human Development Corporation Carr Central District and Model Cities' DeSoto Carr Subcity*, at d (March 1968) (hereinafter referred to as *Neighborhood Handbook*).

tively more important than agency relationships dictated a change in boundaries by Model Cities to align the Model City sub-neighborhoods with HDC districts. The people in DeSoto-Carr were drawn to two different HDC districts, Pruitt-Igoe or Carr Central. The people in the eastern portion demonstrated a distinct lack of appreciation for the problems of Pruitt-Igoe and felt their troubles related more to a physically deteriorated neighborhood than to the inadequacies of high-rise public housing. Hence, the decision to align Model Cities sub-neighborhoods with HDC districts was deemed rationalized.

Assuming that the Model Cities sub-city approach was necessary to achieve citizen participation,⁴⁰ the decision to change the boundaries of the Carr Central and Pruitt-Igoe sub-cities is questionable. The decision to change heightened the fragmentation of the citizen participation structures and increased inward tendencies. It at once highlights the good working relationship between the Model Cities and HDC agencies while documenting that Model Cities was not relating well to other agencies working in the general neighborhood.

IV. THE 1968 DEVELOPMENTS

During 1968, several additional changes in the legal requirements occurred. One was HUD's issuance of new citizen participation requirements for urban renewal projects, which have been mentioned earlier. In April of 1968, HUD's Model Cities Administrator informed the local Model City Agency that urban renewal programs in model neighborhoods would be subject to Model City guides as well as urban renewal requirements. In any final application for an urban renewal project within a Model City neighborhood, HUD would require the city's Mayor, as head of the City Demonstration Agency, to submit a letter stating that urban renewal and Model City plans were coordinated and that the urban renewal application had been reviewed by the citizens.⁴¹

In August of 1968, Congress passed the Housing and Urban Development Act which included what was to become an important legal tool in the land use planning for DeSoto-Carr. The new legislation created the concept of a Neighborhood Development Program (hereinafter referred to as NDP). NDP is designed to facilitate more rapid renewal

40. Model Cities at first experienced trouble in involving citizens in the neighborhoods.

41. Letter from George Parker to City Demonstration Agencies, Apr. 19, 1968.

and allow the development of urban renewal areas on a more effective scale. It is designed to be more flexible than the standard urban renewal project. The standard project is planned and funded as one unit; NDP is to be funded in annual increments with the federal government having the right to terminate at the end of any year.⁴² Moreover, more generalized planning standards and criteria have been substituted in NDP for the specific and detailed restrictions and maps which have often typified urban renewal projects. Physical planning will progress from the general to the specific only as development potential and conditions warrant.⁴³

NDP regulations outline citizen participation requirements for Project Area Committees in Model Cities neighborhoods.⁴⁴ The NDP Handbook states that where the boundaries of an NDP are contained within a model neighborhood, the Model City citizen component should represent the citizens of the urban renewal area. Where the boundaries of an urban renewal area and a model city neighborhood partially coincide, the Model City component should represent the residents of the Model City area and should coordinate its activities with the Project Area Committee (hereinafter referred to as PAC) for the rest of the area. PAC are "to participate in the detailed planning and execution of the activities within the area" and be an integral part of the decision making process regarding the timing and the location of all activities within the project area.⁴⁵

Although NDP was not to be adopted in the DeSoto-Carr project until November of 1968, LCA felt that it needed a citizen advisory group before that time. In late August, Carr Central approached LCA and requested that it function as the advisory group for the urban renewal project. Stating that it was representative of the citizens and the business communities in the area, Carr Central held that it met the legal requirements of federal regulations and it offered to

42. CCH URBAN AFFAIRS REPORTER, ¶¶ 11, 373-76.

43. HUD, NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM HANDBOOK, RHA 7384.1, Ch. 1, § 1 (1968).

44. *Id.* at RHA 7387.1, Ch. 1, § 2. The NDP HANDBOOK states that where the boundaries of an NDP are contained within a model neighborhood, the Model City citizen component should represent the citizens of the urban renewal area. Where the boundaries of an urban renewal area and a Model City neighborhood partially coincide, the model city component should represent the residents of the Model City area and should coordinate its activities with the PAC for the rest of the area.

45. *Id.*

establish a PAC working committee to participate in LCA's planning activities.⁴⁶

Carr Central was not, however, representative of all segments of the urban renewal area. Carr Central's governing board as well as most of its members were residents of the public housing which was outside the urban renewal site. The governing board itself was restricted to residents of the projects. Because of the boundary decision for Model Cities, Carr Central did not have any participants in the western area of DeSoto-Carr.⁴⁷ Nor had there been any interplay between the corporation and any commercial or industrial businessmen in DeSoto-Carr.⁴⁸ Further, the Corporation was not the only citizen group in the area; the Carr Central Tenement Improvement Association also existed. The Association's membership was not only smaller than that of the corporation but was exclusively from the renewal project area. One did not reflect the wishes of the predominant population centers in the general area; the other did not adequately encompass the people in the projects. The ill-aligned borders were beginning to become important.

On the basis that Carr Central more adequately represented the majority of people in the area,⁴⁹ LCA granted Carr Central's request but stipulated that Carr Central must recruit local businessmen to serve on the PAC which Carr Central was to establish.⁵⁰ Because of Carr Central's inadequate representation of all segments of the populace, the corporation took several months to staff the PAC. By November though, all of the required citizen components had been created.

V. SPECIFIC LAND USE PLANNING FOR DESOTO-CARR—CARR CENTRAL

A. *The Neighborhood Plan*

By April of 1968, Model Cities had recognized and contracted with Carr Central, providing the new corporation with funds with which to rent a neighborhood office and to begin planning a program. With the aid of the former planner for Model Cities, who was awarded a

46. Letter from Emma Hall, Chairman of Carr-Central, to Albert Nerviani, Aug. 29, 1969.

47. Letter from Arthur Hessel, LCA Counsel, to Albert Nerviani, Aug. 29, 1968.

48. Interview with Emma Hall, Oct. 25, 1968.

49. The Tenement Improvement Association had not been and has not become a major neighborhood force.

50. Letter from Albert Nerviani to Emma Hall, Sept. 16, 1968.

technical assistance contract by Carr Central, the citizens spent long hours working at a heavy pace to frame both one-year and five-year goals. The structure of the effort was the sub-system, and concentrated upon physical development, health, education, welfare, employment, recreation and culture. The final proposal ranked the proposed programs and their relationship with each other.

This sub-city planning effort in Carr Central was characterized by several phenomena. One was the neighborhood's deep distrust of the LCA, as the people were positive that LCA had a plan *in esse* which did not agree with their desires. Another was that the planning effort followed instructions issued by Model Cities. Following its tenet of high citizen input, Model Cities told Carr Central to dream and to "plan big" as the final plans would have to allow for tradeoffs or compromises with other agencies. Notably, the sub-neighborhood would determine the nature and extent of the tradeoffs they would accept.

By July, 1968, Carr Central had completed its task. The product of its work was a well-documented series of proposals expressing the neighborhood's analysis of what it needed to improve itself. One of the most important products of the neighborhood's work was a series of maps illustrating present building conditions and existing land uses as well as proposed circulation patterns and redevelopment proposals.

The main theme of the proposal was the linkage of residential uses and uses related to residential needs through creation of a corridor of public and residential users running east-west between the housing projects bordering DeSoto-Carr. Thus, the present splitting of residential uses by unrelated commercial and industrial uses would be removed and replaced by new housing and a core of community facilities such as day care and health centers, neighborhood shop complexes and community schools. Proposed circulation patterns would deter traffic from using area roads as "through" streets and would separate the commercial and industrial traffic from the residential. To accomplish this, all but two of the north-south streets were either to end in *cul-de-sacs* or be eliminated in part so as to function only as local roads. Only one east-west street was to bisect the neighborhood. To alleviate the adverse social conditions of high-rise public housing, Carr Central envisioned construction of 4,050 individually-owned housing units on 127 acres and renovation of the high rises to eliminate dwelling units above the sixth floor. The first-year goal was to begin construction on 250 housing units. At the end of the five-year

plan, the neighborhood would have a total of 6,000 housing units sheltering 13,000 people. Approximate cost of the physical redevelopment was \$69,500,000.⁵¹

B. Agency Reaction and Background

Carr Central submitted its plan to Model Cities on the first of August. Model Cities in turn requested that LCA evaluate the proposal before it was submitted for approval to the city's Board of Aldermen. LCA felt that neither the Carr Central nor any of the other four sub-city plans could be reviewed upon such short notice. Furthermore, LCA held that its review of the Carr Central plan must consider the results of survey and planning studies contracted by LCA and then underway for the DeSoto-Carr urban renewal project.⁵²

The Model Cities request and the reaction of LCA reveal the existence of several related problems. In the beginning days of Model Cities, the Model City agency budget was severely limited. It had then held preliminary discussions with LCA to explore the possibility that some of LCA's planning money be diverted to the then-proposed neighborhood efforts.⁵³ Due to differences in the planning required of the two agencies by the Federal government, LCA did not feel that it could abide by the request. Planning for Model Cities was to concentrate upon identifying and analyzing the physical, social and economic problems of its ghetto target area and then describing an overall strategy to overcome each identified problem. This planning was to be based upon readily ascertainable data and was to be the basis for proposals to alleviate the adverse conditions of the ghetto and to coordinate agency operations.⁵⁴ Urban renewal regulations, however, required surveys by professional appraisers and consultants. Land utilization and marketability studies as well as reuse appraisals and a preliminary plat must be submitted with urban renewal funding applications.⁵⁵ If LCA complied with the Model Cities request, it felt it would not have the funds necessary to execute its own plans for the area.

51. All data are directly from the Carr-Central Corporation Model City Plan as originally submitted to Saint Louis Model City Agency on Aug. 1, 1968.

52. Letter from Irvin Dagen, LCA Executive Director, to Margaret Wilson, Acting Director of Model Cities, Aug. 12, 1968.

53. Citizen Participation, *supra* note 38, at 4.

54. HUD, City Demonstration Letter #1, §§ 2-3 (Oct. 30, 1967).

55. HUD, Urban Renewal Handbook, RHA 7214.1, Ch. 2, §§ 1-2 (Feb. 1968).

Because of the LCA studies in DeSoto-Carr, it had been informally agreed that specific physical redevelopment proposals by Model Cities would not be formulated pending the completion of LCA studies.⁵⁶ Hence, the LCA was disturbed by the comprehensive nature of Carr Central's proposals, especially as none of the other four sub-city proposals were as detailed. LCA felt that its tasks were being usurped and it made its objections known, provoking the acting director of Model Cities to retort that urban renewal programs as they are generally conducted do not consider the desires of the residents.⁵⁷

The controversy highlighted two points. HUD had not yet required LCA to form a Project Area Committee, and LCA had not yet formally chosen its citizen component. Secondly, Model Cities guidelines on allowable planning posited that Model City's planning process was not to be a program of basic research. The only physical planning which Model Cities' citizen groups could undertake was that which would allow the city to initiate detailed project planning. The guide specifically stated that "only the general location of community facilities" short of "definitive determination of physical treatment or size or location" was allowable. Model Cities was not to engage in projects and activities which could be financed through federal grant-in-aid programs such as urban renewal.⁵⁸

Although unsuitable for LCA submission to HUD, preparation of Carr Central's detailed maps consumed much time and effort by the residents. The neighborhood was unaware of HUD's Model City guideline, but the Model City agency was charged to know and follow it. By circumventing the guideline, the agency chronicled that it had become more of an advocate for the sub-neighborhood than an agency responsible for coordination and creation of programs designed to assist and meet the needs of the residents. One casual factor in this subtle change in emphasis could be that the Model City agency had lost its director midway in the planning efforts of the neighborhoods after losing both its systems analyst and its chief planner. Thus, Model Cities had lost the part of the staff which had charged itself with coordinating sub-city plans, sub-system needs and on-going and proposed agency plans. Another could have been the Model City director's

56. Letter from Irvin Dagen to Margaret Wilson, *supra* note 53.

57. St. Louis Post Dispatch, Aug. 13, 1968, § A, at 1, col. 1.

58. HUD, City Demonstration Letter #2 at 12 (Nov. 30, 1967).

penchant to stress citizen power to such an extent that citizens felt they were to control the Model City program.⁵⁹

C. LCA Plans

Shortly after the five sub-city plans were submitted to and approved by the city's Board of Aldermen, LCA began to receive interim reports from its contractual consultants, who had been working in the project area since the beginning of the year. Most important of these reports was a land use and marketability survey. The preliminary recommendations of the land use report reflected the increasing influence of the physical and social changes in the area first noted in the GNRP study. The report reflected a further need to expand residential uses beyond the GNRP proposals,⁶⁰ and also supported LCA conclusions that the people in the public housing projects related to residential areas north and west of DeSoto-Carr rather than to the area to the east.

LCA's unofficial reaction to the Carr Central plan was one of cautious dismay. It foresaw the possibility of a future population of 18,000 in the housing alone (2½ children per unit 4,000 units) plus the continuance of approximately 18,000 public housing dwellers—or 36,000 people on the four hundred fifty plus acres of the project area and the adjacent public housing. If the ratio of black to white population remained stable, LCA felt that to follow Carr Central's plans would result only in increasing the size and the depth of the ghetto problem.⁶¹ LCA had to work within a HUD directive that projects should strive toward reducing excessive concentrations of minority group families.⁶²

59. The former director stated in 1969 that several myths had attached themselves to citizen participation. One was that decision making should be reserved unto those that suffer; the second, that institutions which deliver services to the ghetto should be controlled by ghetto residents. The director stated that he at one time had taken these assumptions to be correct and admitted he had aided in spreading what he termed "false doctrines." See Bourgeois and Sher, *The Battle Over Control of Schools; Community Demands and Educational Policy*, Mill Creek Intelligencer, Feb. 1969 at 11.

60. LCA Interim Economic Development Planning Analysis Report for DeSoto-Carr Urban Renewal Area at III-25 (August 1968) (hereinafter cited as Hoffman Interim Report).

61. The average household size in the public housing was 4.65. Hoffman Interim Report, *supra* note 60, at III-21. DeSoto-Carr populace was estimated to be at least 75% black in 1965. Neighborhood Handbook, *supra* note 39, at 6. The 1968 public housing populace was almost exclusively black. Hoffman Report, *supra* note 23, at 40.

62. HUD, Urban Renewal Handbook, RHA § 7207.1. (February 1968).

Aside from the potential consequences of intense residential redevelopment, LCA also surmised that the depth of the areas devoted to commercial uses by Carr Central, exclusive of the southeast quadrant, were too shallow to be economically viable. The Carr Central plan for the southwestern border envisioned commercial development, but the depth of the land would allow for little more than strip development. LCA would have preferred tracts large enough to accommodate a commercial center with adjacent off-street parking.

LCA was also aware of other possibilities and constraints in redevelopment. A rail spur bisected the area from north to south and an east-west industrial steam line served the project area. Both of these assets would be helpful in luring industrial reusers. Furthermore, substantial redevelopment was projected to the east of DeSoto-Carr in an area called Laclede's Landing. LCA and its economic consultants felt that any realistic plans for DeSoto-Carr and the economic reuses possible would depend in part upon developments in Laclede's Landing.⁶³

Results of an independent economic survey contracted by the City Plan Commission under a Community Renewal Program grant from HUD⁶⁴ substantiated LCA's desires to encourage industrial development. Citing that urban renewal projects devoted in part to industrial reuse had contributed significantly to the maintenance and preservation of the city's industrial base and likely had prevented serious economic losses, the report indicated that the city would need an addi-

To complicate the plight of LCA planning, the HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT ACT of 1968 mandates that one half of all new units in residential projects be for low or moderate income families. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(f) (Supp. 1969).

63. Laclede's Landing is a twenty-two acre tract east of DeSoto-Carr and adjacent to the Mississippi River. The projected private redevelopment under the Missouri Urban Redevelopment Corporation Law (Mo. ANN. STAT. ch. 353) will be a mixture of residential, commercial and tourist facilities.

64. The purpose of the Community Renewal Program is to chart the long range program for urban renewal. The program is to be based upon an intensive study of community needs and is a statement of specific actions to meet these needs. Important characteristics of the program are: (1) its comprehensive and community wide nature; (2) its consideration of both immediate and long range needs and resources of the community; (3) its recognition of the importance of social and economic factors in renewal programming and (4) its continuing nature. CCH, *supra* note 42, at §§ 11,788 and § 3571.

The statute states that a program may include, without being limited to, (1) identification of slums, blighted or deteriorating areas (2) measurement of blight (3) determination of resources needed and available to renew such areas (4) identification of potential project areas (5) scheduling of urban renewal activities. The grant is available only to the local plan commission. 42 U.S.C. § 1453(d) (Supp. 1969).

tional 590 acres for industry by 1975.⁶⁵ DeSoto-Carr represented one of the last areas in the city suitable for industrial redevelopment. If there was one concern the Mayor's office had stressed, it was the necessity of improving the city's economic base.

LCA was working under one other constraint in its pursuit of a comprehensive redevelopment plan for DeSoto-Carr. Officially mapped in 1961 and included in the GNRP land use projection was the proposed eastern leg of the northwest radial highway, noted above. HUD directives mandated that LCA consider the location of related major highways in determining proposed land uses and traffic patterns in urban renewal areas. Preparation of a definitive plan should not proceed when the location of a major highway affecting the area has not been determined.⁶⁶ This directive implied that LCA had to include the northwest radial, hereinafter referred to as the Cole Street Expressway, within its land use plan. The expressway was a route that the Carr Central plan did not include.

D. LCA and the Project Area Committee

The divergence in thinking between LCA and Carr Central could not be much greater. Although LCA did not have a land use proposal at the time PAC meetings began, resident members of PAC were convinced that it did and they were determined to defeat industrial redevelopment. The prognosis for constructive cooperation between the two entities was poor, even though each needed the other to realize any redevelopment at all.

The first working meeting of PAC then, was marked by distrust of the LCA by the residents and an LCA staff pessimistic of reaching any agreement with the locality's representatives. After an initial skirmish over inadequate representation of black businessmen—which led Carr Central to appoint a larger committee than the one it first created—it was agreed that the group was to function not as advocates but as synthesizers of ideas and recommenders of preference. PAC was to continue throughout the life of the project's execution and would be

65. Industrial Development Potentials, *supra* note 9, at 54, 59, 67-8.

66. HUD, URBAN RENEWAL HANDBOOK, RHA 7207.1 (Nov. 1968). The Handbook requires that the project plans not conflict with state or federally aided highways. The Feb. 1968 edition required that urban renewal plans be coordinated with all highway plans. The Cole Street Expressway is neither a state nor a federal route.

consulted in the selection of redevelopers. Possession of the veto by the residents was not explicitly recognized. In fact, PAC representatives were informed by HUD regional officials at a later DeSoto-Carr Mid-Planning Conference that their role was advisory only.

The principal concerns of the residents, in order of priority, were those of housing and related facilities, continuation of business enterprises now located in the area (especially those which employed black residents) and attraction of industry which would provide jobs for the area's residents.

Concerning housing and related facilities, the residents' biggest worry was that adequate supporting facilities such as schools would not be available at the time the housing was to be occupied. The residents had had previous experience with the opening of several public housing projects at a time when the schools were inadequate for the increased demand placed upon them by new residents. The residents therefore believed there was little cooperation between LCA and the local school system.⁶⁷ They also noted that an overload of students already existed in the area's schools and that a new school was needed to handle the area's populace.

Although the school system was aware of the area's needs—as evidenced by its ownership of several tracts in the neighborhood for school sites—the system lacked the funds with which to build. Rather than lack of cooperation, the problem of the schools was lack of resources.⁶⁸ The school problem had also been noted by Model Cities. Perceiving the plight of the school system, the Model City staff had not even approached the school authorities, but decided to seek the monies through the device of supplementary funding. Supplementary funding is a provision in the Model Cities legislation whereby money can be used to fund projects and activities ineligible for assistance under federal or state programs, or, secondly, to fund the city's share of a Federal grant-in-aid program.

67. LCA and the housing authority in St. Louis have a common executive director.

68. The school problem had also been noted by Model Cities. Perceiving the plight of the school system, the Model City staff had not even approached the school authorities, but decided to seek the monies through the device of supplementary funding. Interview with B. A. Kleindeinst, Chief Planner of Model Cities, Feb. 26, 1969. Supplementary funding is a provision in the Model Cities legislation whereby money can be used to fund projects and activities ineligible for assistance under federal or state programs, or secondly, to fund the city's share of a federal grant-in-aid program. See CITY DEMONSTRATION LETTER NO. 1, *supra* note 54, at 5.4.

On the housing itself, both PAC and the LCA achieved general agreement on the desirability of residential development in the north-west quadrant and of low-rise housing units.⁶⁹ PAC desired owner-occupied dwellings rather than public housing.⁷⁰ PAC and LCA also agreed that the southeast quadrant adjacent to the central business district should be devoted to expansion of the downtown area. Before the final meeting in which approval of the land use plan was scheduled, PAC and LCA had preliminarily agreed that 75% of the area's buildings were to be razed and that, of the three hundred and seventy acres in the tract, approximately forty-eight acres would be restricted to residential usage. Much of the area would continue to be industrial or commercial. LCA would strive to attract labor intensive industry to DeSoto-Carr. The projected land use plan was ready for final PAC approval.

E. The Land Use Proposals: Controversy

Approval, at least so easily, was not to be obtained, for the proposal did not contain the Cole Street Expressway. LCA had known that the proposed roadway would create problems in its planning efforts. In June of 1968, LCA requested the City Plan Commission to reevaluate its position on the alignment of the Cole Street Expressway. LCA suggested realignment to the north of DeSoto-Carr.⁷¹ On the basis of plans first formulated in 1961 and deemed to be controlling, the Plan Commission rejected the LCA proposal. To the Commission, solving downtown congestion was a prime necessity. Construction of the thoroughfare would complete the northern arm of the long-sought expresway loop designed to facilitate access to the core and to encourage the growth of parking facilities along the fringes of that core. The roadway would act as a buffer between the industrial and commercial land south of its projected right of way and the present public housing to the north. These housing areas would more easily relate to residential areas north and west of DeSoto-Carr than if the roadway were built where LCA suggested. If the northern alternative were adopted,

69. Except in elderly housing, high-rise elevator projects are now prohibited unless there is no alternative. 42 U.S.C. § 1415(11) (SUPP. 1969).

70. LCA's economic consultant also urged that no public housing be built in the DeSoto Carr. HOFFMAN REPORT, *supra* note 23, at 54.

71. Letter from Albert Nerviani to City Plan Commission, June 3, 1968.

traffic patterns around the housing projects would cause increased danger to project residents.⁷²

Concern for the future site of the expressway was to remain of much concern to the Plan Commission and, even through mid-October, the Commission held that the only reason it should be concerned with DeSoto-Carr was that the plans must include the projected expressway. One of the many problems besetting the city planning effort in Saint Louis has been the decentralized nature of the myriad attempts to attack urban deterioration, complicated by a high staff turnover in both the Plan Commission and the Model City agency. The Plan Commission's directorship had been occupied by three people within the year preceding the appointment of a new director in September of 1968. With the appointment of a new director, though, an attempt was made to alleviate the disoriented planning among the various city agencies. The new director was to assume broader responsibilities than those of his predecessors in that, in addition to heading the Plan Commission staff, he was to coordinate urban renewal, housing enforcement and Model City efforts.⁷³ Within a short time of his arrival, the Plan Commission shifted its orientation from downtown and began to aid the Model City agency, which had just received HUD's first rejection of its plan.⁷⁴ It was one of the director's first policy shifts and was characterized as a morally, if not politically, correct decision.

The new director soon became aware of the thorny renewal question in DeSoto-Carr and its related highway controversy. Exploratory

72. Letter from City Plan Commission to Irvin Dagen, July 24, 1968.

73. Interview with Norman Murdoch, City Plan Commission Director, Dec. 6, 1968.

74. The original Model City submission was rejected as it lacked coordination both within itself and with plans of other agencies operating in the area. *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, Oct. 19, 1968, § A, at 3, col. 1. Model Cities responded by compiling the five sub-city proposals into one. This was again rejected by HUD. At this time, HUD had the same objections, but also stressed that the city had an overwhelming responsibility "to administratively manage the program so as to assure the efficient and economical use of grant funds." Letter from Floyd Hyde, Ass't Secretary for Model Cities and Governmental Relations, to Mayor Cervantes, Mar. 7, 1969. HUD questioned whether the existing city agencies had made any substantial commitment to the Model City program; a chronic problem with the Saint Louis Model City effort was "chronic and persistent" use of "tenuous and confusing machinery coupled to no semblance of a system which will avoid duplication or proliferation" of administrative bodies and programs. Letter from G. A. Parker, Ass't Regional Administrator for Model Cities, to Mayor Cervantes, Mar. 24, 1969. HUD held that personal involvement of the chief executive of the city is necessary to achieve the desired levels of comprehensiveness and coordination. Letter from Floyd Hyde to Mayor Cervantes, Mar. 19, 1969.

meetings were held between the Plan Commission and Model Cities staffs at which the alternatives were agreed to be three. One was to demap, which was rejected as it had been attempted before and been rejected by the Plan Commissioners. The second was to remap and place the highway corridor north of DeSoto-Carr. Model Cities was opposed; it would not only move the situs of the controversy northward but would create difficult engineering problems in the construction of interchanges with the North-South Distributor and the interstate highway to the east. The third alternative allowed more promise. An elevated structure with stores and community facilities beneath or a depressed route overlain by plazas presented flexible design alternatives. Of the two, the depressed route would present knotty problems as both rail spurs and sewer connections interspersed the area. The elevated expressway would also present engineering problems to the east. The whole highway question was also under review by the regional planning organization, the East-West Gateway Council, but its studies would not be finished until the spring of 1969.⁷⁵ With the data then available though, the Council director's professional opinion was that the highway was necessary.

To settle the highway controversy, the City Plan director arranged meetings with representatives from Carr Central.⁷⁶ In one heated conference, the dispute threatened to subvert all planning for the area. As the purpose of the meetings became known to the residents, their resentment polarized. People in the neighborhoods felt they would be severed from the rest of the city and that the highway was meant to benefit not them but commuters from the suburbs. Suggestions that neither Model Cities nor urban renewal submissions would be funded without neighborhood approval of the highway failed to assuage the residents. The furthest that some, but not all, of the residents would compromise would be the elevated redesign or a realignment of the right of way southward toward the central core.⁷⁷ The realignment would have placed the highway at the southern border of the neighborhood, adjacent to the parking garages built or planned on the

75. A continuing and comprehensive transportation planning process is required in urban areas of over 50,000 to enable that area to receive federal highway aid. 23 U.S.C. § 134. (1966).

76. Carr-Central had not included the Cole Street route in its plans because it felt it had the power to decide if the route would be built through its neighborhood. Model Cities reputedly had not informed Carr Central of the necessity of inclusion.

77. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 2, 1968, § A, at 1, col. 1.

core's fringe. As high-rise buildings and parking facilities would front directly upon the southern edge of the realigned thoroughfare, the proposal would present insurmountable problems in arranging interchanges with existing streets if it were ever carried to execution.

LCA had meanwhile taken its search for a solution to the State Highway Commission. The State agency informed LCA that the highway commission was overextended, that it would be unable to provide funding within the foreseeable future of ten to fifteen years, and that its plans for the DeSoto-Carr site were restricted to construction of the North-South Distributor to the east. At any rate, the Commission felt that the Cole Street link would not be an integral part of its highway system although the highway west of the North-South Distributor (the radial to the suburbs) would become so.⁷⁸ The Commission did recommend that LCA reserve a belt of one hundred and twenty feet running east-west through the project for possible future use. Interestingly, the Commission's plans for the North-South Distributor included a major interchange with Cole Street. As Cole Street was a narrow one-way street and wider roadways existed two or three blocks either north or south, LCA thought the interchange site made little sense if the Commission held it had no interest in the Cole Street corridor. Officially, the Cole Street Expressway was strictly a city project—and the city did not have the funds.

LCA's interim solution to the increasingly tense and increasingly nebulous highway question was to propose construction of a boulevard which would at once serve to save the land for a future expressway and still allow development to proceed along the projected right of way.

F. The Land Use Proposals: Compromise

While footwork on the highway question was proceeding, PAC was preparing its land use plan, which did not show the highway. The City Plan director felt that his Commissioners would not accept the site plans unless they included the projected expressway. On the afternoon of the meeting with PAC to approve the plan, he insisted that LCA place the highway on the map. LCA acquiesced and superimposed the highway corridor on the land use proposals. PAC members had been unsatisfied with the extent of the proposed residential uses in the compromise plan, but had been assuaged by the knowledge that residential redevelopment was to receive priority and by the fact

78. Interview with Albert Nerviani, Nov. 14, 1968.

that the highway had never been discussed in PAC meetings. With the highway superimposed, however, the inevitable explosion followed and the compromise plan was defeated at the meeting which had been called to approve it.

The disastrous meeting prompted one of the first critical interventions by the Mayor's office, heretofore one of the quietest agents in the planning processes of both DeSoto-Carr and Model Cities. Noting that PAC had to approve the DeSoto-Carr plans within weeks, if not days, in order to get approval by the necessary city agencies and the city Board of Aldermen so that DeSoto-Carr could be included in the 1969 NDP application, the Mayor's office let it be known it felt the highway was very much in the future.⁷⁹ The controversy over an uncertain event to occur at an uncertain date in the future was held to be threatening a more important goal. The fiat was to demap the highway. The Mayor's word, however, could not alone accomplish the demapping. HUD still required that urban renewal plans conform with highway proposals. HUD had, however, imposed NDP on DeSoto-Carr in the project's Mid-Planning Conference. As HUD had previously reserved a 10.5 million dollar allocation for DeSoto-Carr, LCA was reluctant to adopt NDP. LCA surmised that it would need more than that sum to complete the DeSoto-Carr project, which HUD implied would not be forthcoming. If NDP were adopted, however, LCA could use "credits" which the city had created by investing more in other urban renewal projects in Saint Louis than the Federal government required. The credits would enable DeSoto-Carr to progress without city expense. LCA reluctantly opted for NDP.⁸⁰

The new device would seem quite appropriate for DeSoto-Carr. In the long range, it will enable plans to be changed, if necessary, to better reflect the effects of impending development in Laclede's Landing to the east of the Model City program. More immediately, however, it furnished the means to a compromise on the highway, if but only for a time.

As DeSoto-Carr was now under NDP, LCA received HUD approval of a deletion of the Cole Street corridor from the land use proposals

79. Although the Mayor was the head of the City Demonstration Agency, that office exerted its influence through the City Plan Commission and LCA rather than through Model Cities. These informal channels of influence had been used before and grew not by design but by developments. Interview with Robert Duffe, Assistant to the Mayor, Feb. 11, 1969.

80. Interview with Arthur Hessel, Mar. 11, 1969.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION COMES OF AGE

and the Plan Commission received LCA assurance that it would not sell any land in the projected highway right-of-way during its first year operations. The highway problem was temporarily solved, but in a manner unexplained to the residents. Undoubtedly, the highway question will arise anew when the status of DeSoto-Carr is reviewed yearly, as required under the NDP program.

Although the highway question was answered, the residents were still unsatisfied with the residential uses. The preliminary LCA plan which had been rejected had placed the local shop area on the northern edge of the project. An industrial zone separated the eastern public housing project from the population centers existing and projected to the west. PAC wanted the industrial and commercial zones shifted, thereby strengthening the residentially oriented corridor running east-west. The new commercial district is, therefore, adjacent to the southeast quadrant designated for expansion of the central business district. The plan, as altered, was approved by the PAC and has now won the approval of all of the city agencies involved as well as the Board of Aldermen.

Comparatively, the final land use projections stress more the residents' desires than the interests or the needs of the larger community. Without considering the relative merits of the outcome of the highway questions, the land use designations, especially the local commercial ones, are questionable. As stated, local commerce is now located just north of the central business district uses. The economic effect of locating a neighborhood shop facility adjacent to an area designated for central business district uses may well make the shop center site so expensive as to prohibit its development. The LCA alternative, situated on the northern border of the project and therefore closer to the centers of population north and west, would seem to offer a better site with which to attract users who would service the neighborhood.

Because of the nature of NDP and its yearly review, it is difficult to assess whether the citizens have won a veto over the LCA or whether the land use map represents something LCA was willing to compromise in order to begin work on the project. It can be concluded, however, that citizens have had a much greater voice in planning DeSoto-Carr than they had in past urban redevelopment projects. Whether the end product will be more or less beneficial to the larger community because of the citizen participation requirements under which the urban renewal plan evolved remains to be seen.


G. Effects Upon the Neighborhoods

After the land use proposals were approved and the project was advertised, LCA received fifteen redevelopment proposals. Of the fifteen, five are small in scope and envision expansion of area businesses. The other ten, ranging from a convention center to office buildings to federally subsidized housing, are speculative. LCA staff is presently studying the proposals and will shortly begin reviewing them with PAC.


At least one of the speculative proposals will test the extent of neighborhood participation. A group called the Carr Central Development Association has submitted a \$90,000,000 plan for four-fifths of DeSoto-Carr. The most extensive proposal received, it proposes 1,079 dwelling units for large families as well as commercial, industrial and institutional developments. Importantly, it is sponsored by the Carr Central Corporation and, if approved in full, the plan would adversely affect the viability of all of the other nine speculative proposals.⁸¹ As one-half of PAC is from the Carr Central Corporation, PAC will be judging its own plan against all the others. Some may and have called such PAC review a conflict of interest; others foresee the collapse of the DeSoto-Carr project. Still others, most notably residents of the area, see no basic conflict if PAC sanctions the proposal. Regardless of one's opinion on the Carr Central Association submission, the upcoming review of its plan will necessarily define whether neighborhood power is to become neighborhood control and whether the current citizen guides are aiding the growth of successful urban renewal or further impeding a rebuilding of the city.

81. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 6, 1969, § A, at 17, col. 1.

1956 Land Use Plan




GNRP Land Uses (1962)



- Industrial
- Commercial
- Local Commercial
- Public
- Highway
- Residential

Carr Central Plan



- Industrial
- Commercial
- Residential
- Public and Institutional
- Streets (Local)
- Thru Streets

Source: Carr Central Corporation

Preliminary Land Use Proposals—August 1968

