Article

Coase’s Paradox and the Inefficiency of Permanent Strike Replacements

Author: Seth D. Harris (New York Law School)

Abstract

The affinity between the Coase Theorem and the NLRA appears obvious. Both the theorem and the Act acknowledge bargaining as a potentially efficient problem-solving strategy. Both the theorem and the Act set efficiency as a goal. This Article examines this apparent affinity and challenges the idea that the Coase Theorem and the NLRA are compatible.

Keywords: Coase theorem, Collective bargaining, Strikebreakers, Economics & labor law, Economic efficiency, Labor law, National Labor Relations Act, United States, Ronald H. Coase

How to Cite: Harris, S. (2002) “Coase’s Paradox and the Inefficiency of Permanent Strike Replacements”, Washington University Law Review. 80(4).