Information Asymmetries, Rule 13e-3, and Premiums in Going-Private Transactions

Abstract

Among the questions we examine are the following: Are premiums lower in going-private transactions initiated by managers than in going-private transactions initiated by third parties? Did premiums in management-led going-private transactions increase following the adoption of Rule 13e-3? Are premiums in third-party going-private transactions in which management is likely to be an equity participant (i.e., going-private transactions that presently are exempt from Rule 13e-3) lower than premiums in Rule 13e-3 transactions?

Keywords

Leveraged buyouts, Going private (Securities)

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Authors

Jeffry Davis (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission)
Kenneth Lehn (University of Pittsburgh)

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