Suppose José needs a gallon of milk from the grocery store. He puts on his shoes and grabs his car keys and his wallet. The grocery store is located outside of town. José is aware of the inevitable: he’ll have to cross an immigration checkpoint located halfway between his house and the grocery store. Upon arriving at the checkpoint, José must declare his citizenship to an immigration officer. José tells the officer that he is a US Citizen. The officer, however, is skeptical; he asks José for documentation. José, befuddled, pulls out his driver’s license and presents it to the officer. The officer scoffs, informing José that his driver’s license does not prove his citizenship. Thereafter, the officer instructs José to pull over to the side for further inspection. José complies, and other officers inform José that they will search his vehicle. José, having nothing to hide, consents to the search. José waits while officers and a canine inspect his vehicle. He’s nervous; the canine is sniffing all sorts of things in his car. Perhaps it’s the scent of pizza in the rear seat, or perhaps it’s his dog’s hair spread all over the driver’s seat. An immigration officer approaches José, telling him that the canine sniffed marijuana in the vehicle. José can’t believe what he’s hearing. He can only imagine how much longer he’ll be detained at the checkpoint. Will officers tear up his vehicle and find nothing? Will officers delay him further? An officer eventually lets José go. His five-minute trip to the grocery store became a thirty-minute trip. Unfortunately for José, the grocery store closed the minute he left the checkpoint. José returns home, fearful and empty-handed.

The Constitution applies to every person in the United States. It applies to every person regardless of race, citizenry, and immigration status. It certainly applies to individuals like José. Specifically, when a person travels within the United States, he or she can rest assured that in his or her travels, the Constitution will attach itself to each step he or she takes. This includes instances where a person crosses the border from Mexico, Canada, or elsewhere into the United States. But in recent times, it seems as if the Constitution is no longer recognized in some parts of the United States. Concealed by the cloud of an omnipotent and intrusive government, people like José find themselves having to prove their citizenship, defend their ethnicity, and routinely fold on exercising fundamental constitutional rights within the United States. These
procedures occur within 100 miles of the international border. One then must truly ponder when exactly did we begin to shrug off constitutional protections that, presumably, apply within the United States.

The answer leads us to the late seventies, when the Supreme Court held in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte that the United States Customs and Border Protection (“Border Patrol,” or “CBP”) could constitutionally operate checkpoints within the United States for the purpose of conducting brief, routine questioning in order to verify a person’s citizenship and immigration status. The case was fueled by efforts to curtail the flow of undocumented immigrants into the United States from Mexico. Some of these undocumented immigrants came to the United States because of economic opportunities unavailable in Mexico. But throughout the thirty-eight-year history since the Court’s holding, some argue that CBP routinely ignores, misunderstands, or continuously refuses to acknowledge the fact that the checkpoints were to be solely utilized for immigration inquiries.

In addition to preventing undocumented immigrants from entering the United States, the checkpoints “yield a far richer harvest—a cornucopia of contraband, particularly illegal drugs.” Moreover, checkpoints are utilized in other law enforcement functions, such as apprehending human traffickers and intercepting unregistered firearms. One can hypothesize

2. Id. at 551 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)) (finding that approximately 10–12 million undocumented immigrants were in the United States).
3. Id. (citing United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 402 (S.D. Cal. 1973)).
the endless law enforcement functions that checkpoints could serve outside the immigration context: perhaps apprehending inmates who break out of prison, catching notorious drug lords like “El Chapo” Guzman, or perhaps even preventing terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and ISIS from committing gruesome acts against Americans. Thus, the checkpoints can pursue laudable objectives within the United States.

This broader use of the checkpoints, however, “subverts the rationale of Martinez–Fuerte and turns a legitimate administrative search into a massive violation of the Fourth Amendment.” The underlying reasons the checkpoints are scrutinized are twofold. First, the “Martinez–Fuerte [court] approved immigration checkpoints for a very narrow purpose—detecting, and thereby deterring, illegal immigrants.” Second, individuals have become frustrated by the undermining of fundamental constitutional protections that, presumably, apply within the United States. Individuals traveling through the checkpoints consist of US citizens, lawful permanent residents, and foreign travelers. Hispanics primarily take issue with the controversial language from Martinez–Fuerte, where the Court allowed CBP to use “Mexican ancestry” to interrogate, and potentially search, certain individuals. Non-Hispanics likewise take issue with the checkpoints because the procedures have opened the floodgates to harassment and abuse.

A “round-the-clock US Border Patrol presence at the checkpoints means that American citizens must endure inspection when they commute

---

9. Soyland, 3 F.3d at 1316 (Kozinski, J, dissenting).
10. Id. at 1316.
11. Such constitutional protections include the Fourth Amendment’s protection against “unreasonable searches and seizures” and the Fifth Amendment’s protection against “self-incrimination,” commonly referred to as “the right to remain silent.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V.
12. I recognize that there are different names for Spanish-speaking groups such as Hispanics, Latinos, Chicanos, etc. For the sake of convenience, I solely use “Hispanics” throughout this Note with the exception of the discussion of Martinez–Fuerte, where the Supreme Court uses the label “Mexican,” and the discussion of the PHP Study, where the report uses the label “Latino.”
to work or run errands.”¹⁵ Some individuals encounter checkpoints while on their way to the supermarket, a doctor’s appointment, or the bank.¹⁶ Others claim that the checkpoints have negatively affected local communities’ economies, including the real estate market,¹⁷ tourism, shopping, and recreational activities.¹⁸ In fact, in certain places, there is no way to get out of town without encountering a checkpoint.¹⁹ Complaints range from allegations of “unnecessary delays, harassment and sometimes abuse at the checkpoint[s]”²⁰ to allegations of “unconstitutional searches and seizures, excessive use of force, racial profiling, and other agent misconduct.”²¹ While these occurrences are infrequent, they are clear violations of the Constitution and should concern all of us.

This Note proposes standards for checkpoint procedures that would strike an equilibrium between implementing effective law enforcement procedures at interior checkpoints and preserving constitutional values within the United States. This Note distinguishes CBP procedures conducted at the international border, which address compelling governmental interests in regulating foreign commerce and preserving national security, from CBP procedures not conducted at the international border that should be scrutinized much more stringently. 22

Thus, this discussion is broken down as follows. Part I provides a brief history of the checkpoints, including CBP’s organizational structure, its functions at the checkpoints and its authority for carrying out those functions, and the Supreme Court’s approval of checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte. Part II discusses the practical implications of Martinez-Fuerte, including how to prove US Citizenship at checkpoints, whether individuals may refuse to answer non-immigration related inquiries, and the dilemma over CBP not recording individual checkpoint statistics for law enforcement functions. Part III discusses the procedures and legal standards for specific actions that have potential damages claims for unlawful or improper conduct by CBP agents at checkpoints. Moreover, Part III discusses potential barriers one may face when seeking relief from the federal government and its officers for being subject to allegedly unlawful or improper conduct at checkpoints. Lastly, Part IV proposes several reforms that could determine whether the federal government has gained substantial benefits from checkpoint operations that outweigh the costs of operating the checkpoints. Reform efforts include implementing an ombudsman’s office for CBP, implementing an effective, accessible, and external complaint forum, and implementing a “SENTRI-like” program for local communities. Moreover, this Note argues that a

22. This Note will not discuss the application of certain constitutional provisions at the international border. For a discussion delineating a person’s rights at the international border, see Jon Adams, Rights at United States Borders, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 353 (2005).
Supreme Court fix may clarify whether checkpoints can continue to be utilized the way they have been for almost four decades.

I. HISTORY

Following September 11, 2001, there was a “radical restructuring” of some federal agencies whose missions related to national security.\(^2\) The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (“HSA”){\(^2\)} consolidated several federal agencies into a single entity, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).\(^2\) Approximately twenty-two federal agencies, 185,000 federal government employees, and “countless specific functions were transferred” over to DHS.\(^2\) When Congress passed the HSA, it also divided the immigration functions of the DHS into two different entities: one responsible for the immigration enforcement function and the other responsible for the service function.\(^2\) Furthermore, the HSA authorized the president to modify the departmental structure; the president subsequently did so, further dividing the immigration functions of the DHS into three immigration agencies: two enforcement bureaus and one service bureau.\(^2\) The enforcement bureaus are the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and CBP.\(^2\) These entities are responsible for interior enforcement and border enforcement, respectively.\(^0\) ICE is responsible for “investigations, intelligence-gathering, detention, certain elements of the deportation process, the registration of noncitizens, and other interior enforcement operations.”\(3\) CBP, on the other hand, conducts border inspections at various locations, including land borders, airports, seaports, and interior checkpoints.\(3\) This Note focuses solely on CBP operations at interior checkpoints.

---


26. Id.

27. Id.

28. Id. at 3.


30. Legomsky & Rodríguez, supra note 23, at 3.

31. Id.

32. Id.
A. Checkpoint Procedures 101

CBP plays a crucial role in curtailing illegal activity within the United States by operating interior checkpoints in areas reasonably located away from the international border. In 2009, CBP operated approximately seventy-one “permanent and tactical checkpoints on the southwest border.” Presently, CBP operates approximately 170 checkpoints on roads and highways within the United States. Since the United States shares a border with Mexico that is almost 2000 miles long, and much of the border area is “uninhabited desert or thinly populated arid land,” the checkpoints provide support in monitoring secondary roads CBP determines are likely to be used by undocumented immigrants or narcotics smugglers. Although CBP maintains personnel, electronic equipment, and fences along portions of the border, some individuals still find a way to enter the United States undetected. “It also is possible for an

33. CBP checkpoint operations are authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1357, which provides in relevant part:

Any officer . . . shall have power without warrant—within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States, to board and search for aliens any . . . vehicle . . . for the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States.


38. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 552. But see Wayne A. Cornelius, Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Control Policy, 27 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 661, 669–76 (2001) (indicating that the substantial increase of CBP agents and surveillance along the Southwestern border resulted in a large increase in the death rate for persons crossing the border).
[undocumented immigrant] to enter unlawfully at a port of entry by the use of falsified papers.”39 “Once within the [United States], [undocumented immigrants] seek to travel inland to areas where employment is believed to be available, frequently meeting by prearrangement with friends or professional smugglers who transport them in private vehicles.”40 Thus, a CBP checkpoint is “akin to a Port of Entry.”41

Given this context, CBP checkpoints “play a significant, strategic, and tactical role in the support of the National Border Patrol Strategy.”42 CBP currently operates a combination of permanent and tactical traffic checkpoints nationwide as part of a “three-tiered, defense-in-depth strategy” to secure the US Border between ports of entry.43 “This strategy involves the use of line-watch operations [at the international] border, roving patrol operations near the border,[44] and traffic checkpoints on highways leading away from the border.”45 CBP also conducts operations at “functional equivalents” to the international border; in other words, locations away from the international border.46 Functional equivalents operate similarly to an international border.

In fact, since 1998, more than 6,000 migrants have died trying to cross the United States-Mexico border. INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, FATAL JOURNEYS: TRACKING LIVES LOST DURING MIGRATION 12 (Tara Brian & Frank Laczko eds., 2014), available at http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free /FataJourneys_Co unt theUncounted.pdf.

39. Martinez Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 552. The checkpoints are also capable of apprehending individuals who overstay their visas.

40. Id. (citation omitted).


43. Id. This may also include the use of “random” checkpoints. See, e.g., Moveable Border Patrol Checkpoints Showing Up in Laredo Area, KGNS.TV (Aug. 18, 2015, 10:52 PM), http://www.kgns.tv/home/headlines/Border-Patrol-322237502.html.

44. This Note will not discuss the constitutional basis for roving CBP stops. For a discussion involving roving patrol stops, see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).

45. CBP REPORT, supra note 42, at 17. Congress authorizes CBP operations. For example, “[a]ny officer . . . shall have power without warrant—to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (2014).

46. CBP agents may “stop, search, and examine . . . any vehicle . . . he or they shall suspect there is merchandise which is subject to duty, or shall have been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law.” 19 U.S.C. § 482(a) (2014). CBP agents may also examine “documents and papers and examine, inspect, and search the . . . vehicle and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board, and to this end may hail and stop such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary force to compel compliance.” 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2014).

Border Patrol’s strategy must be explored further. Suppose Border Patrol apprehends 99% of unlawful activity at the international border. With that figure, however, 1% of unlawful activity is getting past the international border (presumably, because of human error or some other conceivable
To visualize the checkpoint procedures, each step can be broken down as follows. In most cases, once a motorist arrives at a checkpoint, he or she will very likely be allowed to travel freely “without any oral inquiry or close visual examination.” Only in a relatively small number of instances will a CBP agent conduct further inquiry into a motorist’s immigration status. Usually based on “suspicious circumstances,” a CBP agent will direct a motorist to a secondary inspection area. Once at secondary, a CBP agent may search a vehicle so long as there is probable cause or the motorist consents to the search. In construing what can meet the probable cause standard, an agent may use his or her discretion in conducting a search of the vehicle, but this discretion is usually corroborated by a canine on site alerting the agent to the possible presence of narcotics in a vehicle. Moreover, “probable cause,” in the immigration context, such as the sheer difficulty of policing such a long border). Thereafter, we must determine whether checkpoints, roving patrols, or other mechanisms are preventing that 1% from continuing to travel within the United States. Suppose, 0.5% of unlawful activity is being prevented (for the same reasons mentioned previously). That still leaves Border Patrol with 0.5% of unlawful activity mobilizing outside the 100-mile border zone. Given that “perfect” figures amounting to 100% may be unrealistic, questions remain whether Border Patrol is in fact as effective in only allowing 0.5% of unlawful activity into the United States, whether we are comfortable with that figure, and whether that result is because of primary inspections at the international border or secondary inspections at checkpoints (through deterrence and other tactics). This empirical research will be addressed in a later paper.

48. Id.
49. Id. The plain view doctrine states that a point officer is limited to a visual inspection of a vehicle (i.e. what can be seen without a search). Id. at 558. However, certain characteristics of a vehicle may justify suspicion. For example, whether the vehicle is a certain make or model, whether the vehicle appears to be heavily loaded, whether the vehicle contains an extraordinary number of persons, or whether the vehicle contains persons trying to hide are all relevant factors. Id. at 575 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For further articulations of “suspicious circumstances,” see United States v. Sanders, 937 F.2d 1495, 1500 (10th Cir. 1991) (“In construing what ‘suspicious circumstances’ means, courts should recognize there is no single or narrow definition available to answer all scenarios. Accordingly, some deference is properly given to border patrol agents who, as law enforcement officers, are specifically trained to look for indicia of crime, with an emphasis on immigration and customs laws. So long as their interrogation bears a reasonable relationship to their unique duties, the judiciary is properly reluctant to interfere, and a reviewing court should only determine whether the suspicious circumstances as perceived by the border patrol agent are supported by the facts.”).
51. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 567 (citing United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 (1975)).
context, is the “reasonable belief, based on the circumstances, that an immigration violation or crime has likely occurred.”

There is no formula as to what factors an agent may use to detain someone; detention should, theoretically, be temporary and scrutinized on a case-by-case basis. The detention will likely conclude only after a CBP agent is satisfied with the immigration statuses of the individuals in the vehicle and there are no circumstances that raise suspicion regarding the presence of illegal substances. But these encounters may not always be “brief” or “temporary.” As checkpoints have proliferated, the question of whether some encounters run afoul of constitutional protections under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments has quietly arisen.

What we know for certain is that “[o]nce a vehicle crosses the border, the fourth amendment applies in full force, regardless of the fact that the Border Patrol is authorized by statute to stop and search any vehicle within a 100 mile border zone.” But these fundamental constitutional provisions seem to be, at times, watered down by numerous exceptions intended to carry out compelling law enforcement practices at checkpoints. The following section explores CBP’s authority to operate checkpoints within the United States and how the Supreme Court blessed this authority with its holding in *Martinez-Fuerte*.

---

53. The Constitution in the 100-Mile Border Zone, supra note 33.
54. See *Martinez-Fuerte*, 428 U.S. at 567.
55. In summary, one court has described the entire encounter as follows:
   *A “routine checkpoint stop,” which must be brief and unintrusive, generally involves questions concerning the motorist’s citizenship or immigration status, and a request for documentation. A cursory visual inspection of the vehicle is also routine, and a few brief questions concerning such things as vehicle ownership, cargo, destination, and travel plans may be appropriate if reasonably related to the agent’s duty to prevent the unauthorized entry of individuals into this country and to prevent the smuggling of contraband.*

United States v. Morales, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1263 n.4 (D.N.M. 2007) (citing United States v. Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d 749, 752 (10th Cir. 1993)); *see also Adams, supra note 22, at 366 n.89 (citing United States v. Massie, 65 F.3d 843 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that CBP agents at a checkpoint may briefly question motorists about cargo, destination, and travel plans, so long as such questions are reasonably related to the agent’s duty to prevent either unauthorized entry or smuggling)).
56. Casares, supra note 37.
B. Jurisprudential Roots: United States v. Martinez-Fuerte

Without discussing the facts of Martinez-Fuerte in great length, the Court granted certiorari to the petitioners in order to resolve a circuit split over the constitutionality of the checkpoint procedures.58 The Court consolidated several cases where the defendants had all been convicted of illegally transporting undocumented immigrants. One circuit found the procedures to be reasonable while another circuit found the procedures to be unreasonable.59 The Court analyzed the checkpoint operations under the umbrella of the compelling governmental interest in regulating undocumented immigration.60 In the Court’s writings, this interest could only be furthered by upholding the use of interior checkpoints because the ever-increasing size of border traffic could not be controlled effectively at the international border.61 The Court was comfortable tipping the scales in favor of upholding checkpoints as it believed such operations imposed a de minimis intrusion on an individual’s privacy.62

At the time the case came to the Court on appeal, approximately ten million cars passed some checkpoints annually.63 The San Clemente Checkpoint in San Clemente, California, was one of these checkpoints, and was also one of the subject checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte. In 1973, approximately 17,000 undocumented immigrants were apprehended at the San Clemente Checkpoint.64 Given these numbers, it is unlikely that the Court was sympathetic to the respondents’ arguments that CBP agents had violated their constitutional rights at the checkpoints. In fact, the named respondent, Amado Martinez-Fuerte, produced identification that proved his immigration status, but his passengers, who were undocumented immigrants, admitted to entering the United States unlawfully.65 The Court probably brushed aside these arguments when it was abundantly clear that

59. Id. at 125–26.
61. Id. at 556.
62. Id. at 565.
63. Id. at 554.
64. Id. In an eight-day period the following year, roughly 146,000 vehicles passed through the same checkpoint and 820 vehicles were referred to secondary inspection, which resulted in the discovery of 725 deportable aliens in 171 vehicles. Id.
65. Id. at 547.
the respondents had knowingly violated US immigration laws by transporting undocumented immigrants within the United States.\textsuperscript{66} 

\textit{Martinez-Fuerte} brought to the forefront the legal framework CBP heavily relies on in conducting its operations at checkpoints on a day-to-day basis.\textsuperscript{67} The majority of the Court’s discussion revolved around the applicability of the Fourth Amendment at the checkpoints. The Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment’s protections from “unreasonable searches and seizures” imposed limits on CBP from what otherwise would be “arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials” with an individual’s privacy interests.\textsuperscript{68} In conducting its Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court weighed the public’s legitimate interest in having checkpoints to regulate immigration against an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests.\textsuperscript{69} The Court erred with the former, noting that checkpoint procedures minimally interfered with the Fourth Amendment\textsuperscript{70} and did not completely undermine an individual’s right to “free passage without interruption.”\textsuperscript{71}

The Court believed that the checkpoints served significant law enforcement functions in the immigration context. First, the Court distinguished checkpoint operations from roving patrol stops. Unlike motorists that are pulled over during a roving patrol stop, motorists using major highways are not “taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{72} Moreover, since CBP agents may stop only the vehicles passing through the checkpoint, the Court reasoned that there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than a roving patrol stop.\textsuperscript{73} The Court recognized that these safeguards ensured that CBP agents were not equipped with arbitrary law enforcement discretion.

Second, the Court doubted that CBP administrators would locate a checkpoint where the procedures bear “arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class.”\textsuperscript{74} The Court reasoned that the choice of checkpoint

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{66} See id. at 548, 550.
  \item \textsuperscript{67} Id. at 562–68.
  \item \textsuperscript{68} Id. at 554. The Court noted “checkpoint stops are ‘seizures’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 556.
  \item \textsuperscript{69} Id. at 562.
  \item \textsuperscript{70} Id. at 555, 559.
  \item \textsuperscript{71} Id. at 557–58 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)). “The \textit{Martinez-Fuerte} court recognized the right to freedom of movement but minimized its importance.” Rose, supra note 57, at 318 n.78.
  \item \textsuperscript{72} \textit{Martinez-Fuerte}, 428 U.S. at 559.
  \item \textsuperscript{73} Id. at 561–62.
  \item \textsuperscript{74} Id. at 559.
\end{itemize}
locations was an administrative decision that had to be left largely within CBP’s discretion.\textsuperscript{75} This implies that the Court was reluctant to interfere with an arm of the executive branch. Third, the Court found no constitutional barrier in CBP selectively referring motorists to the secondary inspection area based on “apparent Mexican ancestry.”\textsuperscript{76} The Court reiterated that CBP officers must have wide discretion in selecting motorists to inquire briefly about their citizenship or immigration status.\textsuperscript{77} Overall, the majority found that governmental interests in providing discretion to law enforcement officials to effectively perform their jobs outweighed an individual’s privacy interests.\textsuperscript{78} 

Justice William Brennan heavily criticized the majority’s rationale.\textsuperscript{79} First, he warned that “[e]very American citizen of Mexican ancestry and every Mexican alien lawfully in this country must know after today’s decision that he travels the fixed checkpoint highways at [his or her own] risk.”\textsuperscript{80} I highly doubt a non-Mexican individual would be burdened with such a risk during his or her travels. Second, Justice Brennan noted that an individual, “whose conduct has been nothing but innocent . . . surely resents his own detention and inspection.”\textsuperscript{81} Checkpoints “detain thousands of motorists, a dragnet-like procedure offensive to the sensibilities of free citizens.”\textsuperscript{82} Justice Brennan believed that the delay occasioned by stopping hundreds of vehicles on a busy highway would be “particularly irritating.”\textsuperscript{83} Surely, a non-Mexican individual would be delayed far less than a Mexican individual.

Justice Brennan noted that a Mexican-appearing motorist travels a highway with a checkpoint “at the risk of being subjected not only to a stop, but also to detention and interrogation, both prolonged and to an extent far more than for non-Mexican appearing motorists.”\textsuperscript{84} The Court’s holding opened the door for certain motorists “[t]o be singled out for

\textsuperscript{75} Id. at 562 n.15.
\textsuperscript{76} Id. at 563.
\textsuperscript{77} Id. at 563–64.
\textsuperscript{78} Id. at 561. The Court believed that enhanced CBP discretion was vital for effective law enforcement. Id. at 562 n.15.
\textsuperscript{79} Justice Brennan’s dissent was one of five written in the October 1976 term. See Summary of Actions Taken by the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1976, at L+39 (on file with author).
\textsuperscript{80} Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 572 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
\textsuperscript{81} Id. at 571.
\textsuperscript{82} Id.
\textsuperscript{83} Id.
\textsuperscript{84} Id. at 572.
referral and to be detained and interrogated” in an arbitrary manner.85 Many of Justice Brennan’s fears surfaced following the decision.86

II. REPERCUSSIONS POST-MARTINEZ-FUERTE

The Court’s decision in Martinez-Fuente raised fundamental questions. First, how is a US Citizen supposed to prove his or her citizenship? Second, is an individual obligated to cooperate with a CBP agent at a checkpoint when that agent’s “brief inquiry” exceeds that of an immigration-related administrative interrogation? In the absence of a solution articulated by Congress or the Supreme Court, scholars, journalists, and others have attempted to provide answers to these unanswered questions. Third, have the checkpoints been effective in achieving broader law enforcement roles, and do those roles fit within the Martinez-Fuente framework?

A. Proving Citizenship and the “Mexican Ancestry” Criterion

All motorists, both Mexican-appearing and non-Mexican appearing, have to answer the same question: “Are you a US citizen?”87 The Court did not articulate how a US Citizen must prove his or her citizenship when traveling within the United States. This ambiguity raises a secondary question of whether local residents are required to carry documentation to verify their residency when they are only usually obligated to do so when traveling outside of the country and then seeking re-entry. Documentation is technically not required at a CBP checkpoint unless the vehicle contains lawful permanent residents, who are required to carry their alien registration cards (“green cards”) “at all times.”88 And for foreign visitors, most, if not all, have their visas or passports readily available. However, most US Citizens do not carry their birth certificates, passports, social security cards, or naturalization certificates on their person. While the majority of US Citizens carry their driver’s license on their person, this form of identification may be deemed insufficient to prove citizenship at checkpoints.89 Thus, proving citizenship is mind-bogglingly difficult.

85. Id.
86. For a list of complaints alleging abuse at checkpoints in Arizona, see generally L.YALL ET AL., supra note 52, at 6–7, 19–25.
87. See Sharkey, supra note 18.
This documentation requirement particularly revolves around the Court’s “Mexican ancestry” criterion as a basis for CBP to interrogate, and potentially search, some individuals. CBP wields a “license to profile” at the checkpoints. The criterion is difficult to implement without blatantly profiling an individual on the basis of their physical appearance; some US Citizens and documented immigrants easily fall into the broad “Mexican ancestry” criterion. In fact, some cabinet members in the Obama administration could very well fall into this category. Simply put, the fact that it is impossible to prove one’s US citizenship without carrying specialized documentation makes the requirement of proving one’s citizenship problematic. Basically, asking a US Citizen to prove his or her citizenship, and thereafter allowing the agent to further interrogate and/or search said individual on the mere basis of his or her ethnicity is quite the conundrum. To then add a further layer of difficulty by singling out individuals by ethnicity when no one else would face a similar burden is unconscionable. So while the use of the “Mexican ancestry” criterion serves the underlying goal of apprehending undocumented immigrants, the broad net cast by the Court inadvertently

90. The Court’s criterion is not free of criticism. See, e.g., United States v. Galindo-Gonzales, 142 F.3d 1217, 1223 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[A] person’s racial characteristics are insufficient to establish the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify detention after a checkpoint stop conducted a substantial distance from the Mexican border.”); United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 860 (9th Cir. 1973) (demonstrating the impracticality of using “Mexican [ancestry]” as a factor in detaining an individual because “[i]t is impossible to determine from looking at a person of Mexican descent whether he is an American citizen, a Mexican national with proper entry papers, or a Mexican alien without papers”); Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 677–78 (2000) (footnote omitted) (“Race-based enforcement deserves special scrutiny because it disproportionately burdens persons of Latin American ancestry in the United States, the vast majority of whom are U.S. citizens or lawful immigrants. Generally speaking, whether they are U.S. citizens, lawful immigrants, or undocumented aliens, persons of Latin American ancestry or appearance are more likely than other persons in the United States to be stopped and interrogated about their immigration status.”).

covers other individuals and leads to unintended consequences of harassment and abuse.

But others defend the “Mexican ancestry” criterion because it is viewed as the only effective way to stop undocumented immigration. Some argue that the “Mexican ancestry” criterion is essential in pursuing law enforcement goals because CBP agents “have [a] very short period of time to make an assessment as to whether further inquiry needs to be given.” Given CBP’s short time frame, the “Mexican ancestry” criterion is reasonable in light of the fact that some undocumented immigrants coming from the southern border are Mexicans. It is conceivable that CBP agents, like others, have biases, which are most likely activated in situations requiring an agent to make a split-second judgment. In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court explicitly allowed these implicit biases to be used in determining who is subject to Fourth Amendment violations. Another reason behind not implementing a more lagged procedure at checkpoint interrogations is that such a procedure may be impractical. The flow of traffic varies by region, but those regions with much heavier traffic are likely to implement procedures that are much more expeditious than their counterparts.

In multiple recent law enforcement contexts, questions have been raised about the legality of law enforcement procedures that either explicitly or implicitly rely on racial profiling. Such procedures have been heavily scrutinized. In 2014, the Obama Administration issued new rules curtailing the use of profiling in federal law enforcement procedures. The new rules impose new training requirements that would require federal agents to keep records on complaints they receive about profiling, presumably including CBP agents located at checkpoints. Moreover, the new rules offer more protection against discrimination than that required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. But the new rules did not go as far as advocates hoped; they exempt federal agents from the prohibition on considering race and ethnicity when stopping people at airports, border crossings, and immigration checkpoints. Thus,

92. Apuzzo & Schmidt, supra note 33 (noting that DHS officials argue that ignoring ethnicity in border enforcement procedures is “impractical”); see also Adams, supra note 22, at 361 (noting that a CBP agent may “routinely search people he would not have routinely searched solely because of their race or ethnicity”); Connor, supra note 91, at 619–20 (concluding that considerations of racial appearance may be appropriate).
93. Apuzzo & Schmidt, supra note 33.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
even with the new rules, US citizens who appear to be of Mexican ancestry will continue to struggle to comply with checkpoint procedures.

B. Refusing to Answer Non-Immigration Questions

In *Martinez-Fuerte* and its progeny, the Court has failed to address whether a motorist may refuse to answer a CBP agent’s questions—primarily those that go beyond the scope of a routine immigration inquiry. This scenario arises in the instance where CBP agents ask questions that go beyond verifying a motorist’s residency, which changes the line of questioning from an administrative one to a law enforcement one. One federal circuit has held that checkpoint stops ought to be “limited to the justifying programmatic purpose of the stop: determining the citizenship status of persons passing through the checkpoint.”97 This means the stop is restricted to “the time necessary to ascertain the number and identity of the occupants of the vehicle, inquire about citizenship status, request identification or other proof of citizenship, and request consent to extend the detention.”98

One justice did consider whether motorists could refuse to answer non-immigration related questions. At oral argument in the *Martinez-Fuerte* case, Justice Thurgood Marshall asked both sides whether a motorist could leave a checkpoint freely after verifying his or her citizenship or immigration status.99 Both sides could not answer this question, and the Supreme Court did not address the question in its opinion. Today, however, commentators, government officials, and legal scholars seem to be a lot more certain regarding whether or not individuals may refuse to cooperate with CBP.

For instance, one commentator notes that law-abiding citizens may not be detained for refusing to listen to or cooperate with an immigration officer, presumably including at a CBP checkpoint.100 In another instance, a CBP spokesman said a motorist can refuse to answer questions, but will not be allowed to proceed until his or her citizenship or immigration status is verified.101 Furthermore, one court was faced with this question, but

---

98. Id.
held, for different reasons, that a referral to secondary inspection was valid.\textsuperscript{102} Moreover, Ms. Denise Gilman, Co-Director of the Immigration Clinic at the University of Texas School of Law, said that “[CBP] agents at inter[ior] checkpoints are allowed to ask motorists basic questions about citizenship, identity and travel itinerary, but they cannot detain you or search your vehicle without probable cause. Your refusal to answer questions would not provide probable cause to allow for such a detention or search . . .”\textsuperscript{103}

In order to further interrogate a motorist past the initial interrogation phase, CBP agents need (1) probable cause that an immigration law has been violated or (2) the driver’s consent to a search of his or her vehicle. With respect to the latter, one court noted that a driver may refrain from consenting to a search, and thereafter is allowed to leave without consequence.\textsuperscript{104}

While the Court in \textit{Martinez-Fuerte} ruled solely on the application of the Fourth Amendment at checkpoints, a future case could implicate the protections of the Fifth Amendment—particularly, the protection against self-incrimination. The role of the Fifth Amendment at checkpoints, especially in the context of refusing to cooperate with CBP, brings to the forefront the difference between routine immigration inquiries and broader law enforcement inquiries.\textsuperscript{105}

For starters, the Court noted that individuals are theoretically “seized” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment during the initial inquiry.\textsuperscript{106} Thus, an individual may not leave until a CBP agent allows it. In fact, driving away from a checkpoint without CBP’s consent is a felony.\textsuperscript{107} Given this, one can argue that an individual is in custody and thus Fifth Amendment protections apply. This then begs the question of whether CBP agents must administer \textit{Miranda} warnings to detained individuals at

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{102} United States v. March., No. CR-13-02249-001-TUC-JGZ (BPV), 2014 WL 2584458, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 10, 2014) (noting that the CBP agent in the specific case referred the motorist to secondary inspection for “suspicious circumstances,” such as nervousness, that he noticed before the motorist refused a search of his vehicle).

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Casares, supra} note 37 (quoting Denise Gilman, Co-Director of the Immigration Clinic at the University of Texas School of Law).


\textsuperscript{105} \textit{See} Adams, \textit{supra} note 22, at 367 n.93 (citing United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895, 899 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that the routine questioning of individuals wishing to enter the United States does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination)).


\end{flushleft}
checkpoints. With respect to broader law enforcement uses, “[i]f the initial, routine questioning [at a checkpoint] generates reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity, the stop may be lengthened to accommodate its new justification.”\(^\text{109}\) Certainly, “an investigatory stop is not an arrest”; however, the detainee’s right to roam freely “is as restricted as if he were temporarily placed under arrest [because] [t]he seizure of his person is equally against his will and equally complete,” and because “an attempt to avoid stopping would lead to pursuit by the Border Patrol, and presumably would amount to probable cause to arrest and to search the vehicle.”\(^\text{110}\)

Information obtained at a checkpoint stop would usually be used for deportation proceedings. Deportations, however, are not criminal proceedings and thus defendants in such cases are not entitled to the protections against self-incrimination arising out of the Fifth Amendment.\(^\text{111}\) The Fifth Amendment could, however, apply in a scenario where CBP’s questions went beyond the immigration context. Examples include those where an agent asks whether a motorist is transporting contraband or undocumented immigrants. Answering this question could potentially result in revealing self-incriminating evidence.\(^\text{112}\) One may doubt, however, that an agent would be so blunt in his or her interrogation, or similarly that an individual would be so forthright in answering such a question. Nonetheless, such questioning could be considered “verbal searches” that entitle an individual to constitutional protections.\(^\text{113}\) While the Court clearly discussed the constitutionality of the checkpoint operations through a Fourth Amendment lens, it remains a mystery what other constitutional protections apply at checkpoints since the Constitution applies with full force within the United States.

\(^{108}\) Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Adams, supra note 22, at 369 n.108 (citing United States v. Estrada-Lucas, 651 F.2d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that Miranda protections are triggered at a border inspection when an individual “reasonably believe[s]” he is not free to leave the inspection)), with Adams, supra note 22, at 369 n.102 (citing United States v. Tai-Hsing, 738 F. Supp. 389, 393 (D. Or. 1990) (holding that a Miranda warning is unnecessary during a routine immigration inspection where the individual is referred to a secondary search)).

\(^{109}\) United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 434 (5th Cir. 2001).

\(^{110}\) Rose, supra note 57, at 318 (footnote omitted).

\(^{111}\) Id. at 319.

\(^{112}\) Id. at 320.

\(^{113}\) Id.
C. Recording Individual Checkpoint Data

Checkpoints “remain a critical piece of infrastructure and a highly effective tool in [the] enforcement efforts to secure [the] nation’s borders.”\(^{114}\) In fiscal year 2013, CBP agents at checkpoints were responsible for seizing over 340,000 pounds of marijuana, which was 14% of the 2.4 million pounds of marijuana confiscation by CBP agents along the northern and southern borders.\(^{115}\) Moreover, in the past four fiscal years combined, CBP checkpoints were responsible for intercepting more than half of the heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine seized overall in that same period.\(^{116}\) The checkpoints have also proven invaluable for preventing undocumented immigrants from entering the United States. In fiscal year 2012, CBP enforcement at checkpoint operations nationwide accounted for the apprehension of over 7500 individuals, which represented 2% of CBP’s total apprehensions.\(^{117}\) In the same year, CBP also referred over 1800 cases to the US Attorney’s office.\(^{118}\)

But while CBP’s achievements are highly commendable, a crucial point must be made. The Court in *Martinez-Fuerte* was motivated by a desire to curtail the flow of undocumented immigrants into the United States from Mexico.\(^{119}\) The Court barely made any mention of using the
checkpoints to primarily seize narcotics, which, according to the statistics, has overwhelmingly been CBP’s greatest success.

But there are no statistics documenting the success or failures of CBP’s use of expanded law enforcement functions at checkpoints. CBP only records statistics for the checkpoints by sector. CBP does not disclose “stop data or other information related to interior enforcement operations”; thus, “what little is publicly known has been revealed through FOIA [‘Freedom of Information Act’] requests and litigation.” The lack of individual statistics makes it more difficult to determine whether one specific checkpoint provides a net benefit that outweighs the cost of maintaining the specific checkpoint. To this point, the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), Congress’ auditor, has delineated numerous issues with CBP’s “internal monitoring of checkpoint operations, including ‘information gaps and reporting issues [that] have hindered public accountability, and inconsistent data collection and entry [that] have hindered management’s ability to monitor the need for program improvement.’” Some litigants have alleged that failing to disclose certain CBP documents may violate the FOIA and impede “efforts to educate the public on the many questions that remain regarding the full extent and impact of wide-ranging interior enforcement operations conducted by the largest law enforcement agency in the country.”

Due to this lack of transparency, outside groups have taken the initiative and begun to record individual checkpoint statistics. In 2014, People Helping People in the Border Zone (“PHP”), a humanitarian group based in Arivaca, Arizona, monitored a checkpoint located in its town. For three months, PHP monitors recorded several pieces of information during their observations, including: (1) vehicle descriptions; (2) motorist descriptions; (3) the duration of each stop; (4) what occurred during the stop, such as whether individuals were asked for identification or referred

---

120. See id. at 556–57 (mentioning briefly that checkpoints force drug smugglers to use secondary roads).
121. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 34. Even then, CBP formally records traffic stops only when an arrest is made. See LYALL ET AL., supra note 52, at 2; Howard Fischer Capitol Media Services, Drivers Abused at Border Patrol Checkpoints, ACLU Says, TUCSON.COM (Oct. 15, 2015, 7:10 PM), http://tucson.com/news/local/border/drivers-abused-at-border-patrol-checkpoints-aclu-says/article_4b4e32a2-fae2-54b6-8641-d2d40437cd0c.html.
123. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 122, at 5 (alteration in original) (quoting GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 28).
124. Id. at 6.
125. Checkpoint monitors ended their studying in late April due to climate concerns.
to a secondary inspection; (5) the use of service canines; (6) the CBP agents’ identity; and (7) the vehicle occupants’ gender, age, and ethnicity.126 After monitoring over 2000 vehicles, PHP concluded that CBP agents engaged in unlawful practices at the checkpoint by the “systemic racial profiling of Latino motorists.”127

The PHP Study made several findings to support its conclusion. First, of the vehicles used in the study, 1938 were occupied by “White-only” occupants while 210 were occupied by “Latino-only” occupants.128 Applying PHP’s methodology to this figure, CBP agents were “[twenty-six] times more likely” to ask a Latino-occupied vehicle to demonstrate immigration documents for verification than a “White-occupied vehicle.”129 Second, CBP agents were “[twenty] times more likely” to order a Latino-occupied vehicle to secondary inspection.130 Lastly, after observing over 2000 vehicles, including those that were referred to secondary inspection, the PHP Study found that CBP had not apprehended a single individual, citizen or non-citizen, and CBP seized no contraband.131 But what is truly the most fundamental takeaway from the PHP Study is that it provides the public with information CBP has not provided: individual checkpoint statistics.

CBP could emulate the PHP Study by tracking individual checkpoint statistics. Doing so would provide CBP with enough information to conduct a full cost-benefit analysis to determine which locations are the most feasible for future checkpoint operations. A cost-benefit analysis would also allow CBP to carefully scrutinize which current checkpoints fall behind in performance standards. This is the precise recommendation the GAO has made in the past.132 As the Court noted in Martinez-Fuerte,

---

126. PEOPLE HELPING PEOPLE, COMMUNITY REPORT: CAMPAIGN DOCUMENTS SYSTEMIC RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AT ARIZONA BORDER PATROL CHECKPOINT 2 (2014), available at http://phparivaca.org/?p=567 [hereinafter “PHP STUDY”]. One caveat to the PHP Study is that the monitors, faced with the threat of arrest, had to make their observations from a distance well outside the CBP inspection area, thus impairing a full ability to observe or listen to the CBP agents’ procedures. Id. at 1. Nonetheless, the monitors collected their data to the best of their ability. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2. According to the PHP Study, while other classifications were considered, only these two categories were used in analyses. Id. at 3.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 4. This finding can go both ways: either the checkpoints have effectively mitigated narcotics transportation in the Arivaca area for approximately two months, or that in fact the checkpoint is simply a nuisance to the residents in the area.
132. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-435, AVAILABLE DATA ON INTERIOR CHECKPOINTS SUGGEST DIFFERENCES IN SECTOR PERFORMANCE 8 (2005) (“Border Patrol does not routinely maintain data on the costs of operating checkpoints.”).
CBP is unlikely to place a checkpoint in an area where it “bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class.” Using the people of Arivaca as an example, the checkpoint there is certainly oppressive to Hispanics in the study. Unaccounted for checkpoint operations may cause Hispanics to leave the area, and perhaps deter Hispanics from living in or visiting Arivaca. A pilot program intended to individually monitor checkpoints and report the specific checkpoints’ successes and failures would be a reasonable compromise that both recognizes checkpoints’ utility in some areas and moves toward a more transparent government.  

III. REDRESSABILITY POST-MARTINEZ-FUERTE

“[A] claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial review.” This language, uttered by the Supreme Court in Martinez-Fuerte, was presumably addressing Justice Brennan’s concerns. If an individual is subject to harassment and abuse at the checkpoints, or if CBP violated an individual’s constitutional rights, that person can seek legal or injunctive relief through the courts. The person can find further relief through non-judicial avenues, such as filing a complaint with CBP against an individual officer.

136. See id. at 567–78 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. For an insightful discussion about available judicial remedies for constitutional violations, see generally Watkins, supra note 16 (noting that individuals who are harassed by government officials during an immigration inquiry may have a cause of action against such government officials).
138. While the majority of this section will cover judicial remedies, a few words about non-judicial remedies are necessary. Generally, a driver, his or her occupants, or “any other interested party” can file a complaint against a border patrol agent after misconduct at a checkpoint. See Bill Ong Hing, Border Patrol Abuse: Evaluating Complaint Procedures Available to Victims, 9 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 757, 765–66 (1995). Complaints may be initiated through CBP personally, or, in the case of Mexican nationals traveling on the interstate, through the Mexican consulate. Id. Theoretically, complaints should be forwarded to the Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”), a subdivision of the DOJ. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 287.10(a) (1993)). Thereafter, “the matter could die at the OIG, end up in the hands of the Civil Rights Division of the [DOJ] for criminal civil rights prosecution, or go to the INS’s Office of Internal Audit and the Border Patrol supervisor of the agent for meting out
A. Judicial Relief

There are two types of judicial remedies: equitable relief and damages.139 With respect to the former, individuals who wish to halt certain CBP actions can do so through an injunction, assuming they have standing in federal court.140 Some have requested injunctive relief from CBP, alleging that its agents violated their First Amendment rights at a checkpoint.141 Similarly, one may seek injunctive relief in the form of a request that CBP comply with existing federal law. For instance, plaintiffs sought injunctive relief when CBP allegedly failed to furnish public information requested through FOIA.142 The Supreme Court has traditionally allowed actions against federal officers who are “allegedly acting in excess of their legal authority or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute.”143 Thus, seeking injunctive relief may halt unconstitutional
government actions.\textsuperscript{144} If, however, the federal officer is acting within the terms of his or her authority, and the complainant has not alleged that the action is unconstitutional, then injunctive relief is unavailable regardless of the allegedly wrongful conduct.\textsuperscript{145}

But most federal judges are unlikely to grant injunctive relief, especially when there is an adequate remedy at law. Thus, assuming federal judges err on the side of not granting injunctive relief, individuals are more likely to successfully receive relief by pursuing remedies under \textit{Bivens} and/or the Federal Torts Claims Act ("FTCA"). Federal judges are more likely to grant these remedies.

1. \textit{Bivens} Relief

\textit{Bivens} \textsuperscript{146} relief is a judicially created remedy.\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Bivens} dealt with damages actions against federal officials for constitutional violations.\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Bivens} relief became available after the Supreme Court refused to rely on state common law causes of action in tort to remedy constitutional violations.\textsuperscript{149} In the checkpoint context, a plaintiff could file for \textit{Bivens} relief when he or she is referred to secondary inspection and a CBP agent searches his or her vehicle without probable cause or consent, which would run counter to the Fourth Amendment.\textsuperscript{150} But the Supreme Court suggested that \textit{Bivens} relief is unavailable in two situations. First, there is no cause of action if there are "special factors counseling hesitation in the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotemark[144] Id.
\footnotemark[145] Id.
\footnotemark[147] While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes actions against state and local officers for civil rights violations, federal officers may be sued under \textit{Bivens} or the FTCA for similar civil rights violations. See \textit{Chemerinsky, supra} note 140, at 605 n.1 (citing \textit{Wheedlin v. Wheeler}, 373 U.S. 647, 650 (1963) (holding that federal officers are not liable under § 1983)). Federal officers, however, may be sued under § 1983 when “they act in concert with state or local officers” in violating one’s civil rights. \textit{Id.} (citing \textit{Dombrowski v. Eastland}, 387 U.S. 82, 83 (1967)).
\footnotemark[149] See \textit{Chemerinsky, supra} note 140, at 609 ("[I]ndividuals whose rights have been violated should not be relegated to state law remedies, which might be inadequate or hostile to the federal constitutional interest.").
\footnotemark[150] In fact, the plaintiff in \textit{Bivens} alleged a Fourth Amendment violation after federal agents, without a warrant, stormed into his house in search of narcotics. \textit{See Bivens}, 403 U.S. at 397–98.
\end{footnotes}
absence of affirmative action by Congress." The Court did not elaborate as to what would constitute "special factors" in future cases. Second, the Court suggested that there is no cause of action against federal officials in their individual capacity if Congress has explicitly provided an "equally effective" mechanism for redress.

*Bivens* relief is also heavily contested. For instance, while the Court explicitly created *Bivens* relief for damages against federal officers for violations of the Fourth Amendment, it has subsequently recognized existing causes of action for infringements of the Fifth Amendment. It is unclear if *Bivens* applies to checkpoint violations of the Fifth Amendment. Some lower federal courts have recognized *Bivens* relief for violations of the Fifth Amendment. The issue, however, is that these cases dealt more with alleged violations of the Due Process clause within the Fifth Amendment as applied to the federal government, not alleged violations of the Fifth Amendment's so called "right to remain silent" as this Note posits. But *Bivens* relief may not be available depending on one's immigration status. In a recent case of first impression, one federal circuit determined that undocumented immigrants arrested and detained for civil immigration enforcement actions may not bring *Bivens* actions against the arresting CBP agents.

"In more recent years, the rate of success—either through litigated judgments or monetary settlements—has been estimated at below two percent." Furthermore, *Bivens* relief is, arguably, ineffective. Between 1971 and 1985, litigants filed approximately 12,000 *Bivens* actions, but only four litigants obtained judgments that were not reversed on appeal. Other legal scholars, however, have reached a different conclusion regarding the effectiveness of *Bivens* actions. Additionally, it is impractical for many potential plaintiffs to file for *Bivens* relief. For instance, the harm a motorist suffers at a secondary checkpoint varies.

151. Id. at 396.
152. Id. at 397.
155. See De La Paz v. Coy, 786 F.3d 367, 371 (5th Cir. 2015).
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 813 (2010) (noting that "Bivens cases are much more successful than has been assumed by the legal community"). Professor Reinert found success rates, including settlements, ranging from 16% to more than 40%. Id.
While a CBP agent’s unlawful search of a vehicle constitutes an illegal trespass, the plaintiff can only claim nominal damages without actual property damage. Many attorneys would be unwilling to take such a case to court, deeming it not cost effective. An additional problem is that some motorists may be unable to procure an attorney, due to lack of both funds and knowledge of where to even locate an attorney. Litigants that attempt to go to court in a pro se capacity are unlikely to stand a chance against the federal government in court. These litigants will have to “navigate statutory schemes that can be complex and confusing and are not always gap-free.”

2. FTCA Relief

In addition to Bivens relief, litigants can also seek relief from the federal government under the FTCA. The FTCA establishes exclusive federal district court jurisdiction and waives sovereign immunity in actions against the United States:

For injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.

A claim under the FTCA is different from an ordinary tort action. Specifically, an action under the FTCA may not be filed unless the claimant has “first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency” and the agency has failed “to make final disposition of a claim within six

159. Bus see Adams, supra note 22, at 355 n.11 (citing United States v. Bews, 715 F. Supp. 1206, 1211 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding a Fourth Amendment violation when CBP agents searched a person’s travel bag even after the person gave legitimate reasons for his visit)).

160. The Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980 (“EAJA”), however, authorizes a court to award attorney’s fees to a party who prevails against the United States in court, unless the government’s position was “substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), (d)(1)(A) (2014). For success stories, see Lauritzen v. Lehman, 736 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1984) (allowing attorney’s fees to be awarded); cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 140, at 628 n.120 (listing authorities that did not allow attorney’s fees to be awarded).

161. Fallon et al., supra note 148, at 866.


Tortious actions such as unlawful detention and property damage are included under the FTCA. But of particular significance to potential litigants in the context of the FTCA is an exemption of liability for the United States for most intentional torts. For example, the FTCA states that the federal courts are denied jurisdiction over claims such as assault, battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment. In 1974, however, the FTCA was amended to permit recovery against the United States for these torts when committed by federal law enforcement officers. The modification, among other things, came as a result of instances where federal narcotics agents were engaging in “illegal behavior,” and many individuals were unjustly left without relief.

There are some key distinctions between Bivens actions and relief under the FTCA. First, Bivens actions are designed to address constitutional violations whereas the FTCA is designed to address tort claims and state civil rights claims. Second, Bivens actions may be solely brought against federal agents acting in their official capacity under color of federal law. By contrast, the FTCA is a statutory remedy where the United States waives sovereign immunity and a litigant may sue the United States. Third, the statute of limitations for a Bivens action is based on the forum state’s statute of limitations for a personal injury action. The FTCA, on the other hand, requires litigants to exhaust an administrative remedy within two years of the alleged misconduct. If the administrative claim is denied, litigants have six months to file an action seeking judicial relief.

164. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2014). Relief under the FTCA is limited solely to money damages, with the exception of punitive damages, which the FTCA prohibits. FALLON ET AL., supra note 148, at 862. However, punitive damages and jury trials are available under Bivens. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980).

165. See Saylor, supra note 146, at 277–78.

166. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2014); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 638.

167. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 638.

168. Id.

169. For an in-depth discussion delineating these distinctions, see Phillip Hwang, Suing Government Officials for Damages, in IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 459, 464 (2009).

170. Id.

171. Id.

172. Id. In fact, the most frequent litigant in the courts of the United States is the United States. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 163, at 127 n.2 (finding that the United States is a party in more than one-quarter of the civil cases in the district courts). For the rise and decline of civil rights litigation, see id. at 134–35.


174. Id.

175. Id.
With respect to damages and attorney’s fees, *Bivens* claims do not have a cap on damages so long as FTCA claims are not simultaneously alleged in the complaint. On the other hand, the FTCA places a 20% cap on damages if the case is settled administratively (i.e., litigants cannot recover more than 20% of the total settlement reached), and 25% if resolved after the filing of a court case (i.e., litigants cannot recover more than 25% of the total judgment awarded). Moreover, attorney’s fees are unavailable in *Bivens* actions, but are possibly available under a different statutory scheme such as the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), so long as the federal government acted in bad faith in ordering certain CBP conduct.

B. Qualified Immunity and Other Barriers to Relief

Both *Bivens* relief and FTCA relief have shortcomings. For one, “[m]any civil rights cases have been dismissed by federal and state courts based on qualified immunity.” “Qualified immunity protects public officers from suit if their conduct does not violate any ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Upon raising a qualified immunity defense, litigants suing the individual officers bear the burden of showing that the agents violated a known constitutional right, and such constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time of the incident. A constitutional right is clearly established if it “would have been clear to a reasonable officer that his

176. *Id.*
177. *Id.*
178. *Id.* EAJA relief is available in administrative and judicial proceedings. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2014) (administrative); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2014) (judicial). Other distinctions include that jury trials are available in *Bivens* actions but not in FTCA actions, and CBP agents may claim qualified immunity in *Bivens* actions and the “discretionary function exception” in FTCA actions. Hwang, *supra* note 169, at 464.
179. For a list of exceptions to the FTCA, see Saylor, *supra* note 146, at 278–81. For our purposes, two exceptions warrant attention. First, there is the “discretionary function exception,” which excludes any claim “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” FALLON ET AL., *supra* note 148, at 862 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)). Second, there is the “due care in implementing invalid statutes and regulations exception,” which excludes claims “based upon the action of a government employee ‘exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not . . . valid.’” *Id.* at 863.
180. CHEMERINSKY, *supra* note 140, at 554. Officers must raise qualified immunity as an affirmative defense or else risk waiver. See *id.* at 546; Saylor, *supra* note 146, at 284.
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.\textsuperscript{183} Qualified immunity applies unless both prongs are satisfied.\textsuperscript{184}

1. Practical Complications

Additionally, both Bivens relief and relief under the FTCA are litigation-only remedies. Litigation is expensive, so a litigant will have to factor in a substantial amount of money in attorney’s fees and costs in weighing a decision to file or not file suit. Moreover, in the FTCA cases, the United States is the defendant, and the likelihood of success against the government in such cases is low. Truly then, the majority in Martinez-Fuerte did not foresee the practical barriers an individual may face when seeking relief after an unlawful checkpoint stop. This undermines a crucial factor in the Court’s holding in Martinez-Fuerte: that the courts would be accessible to the aggrieved.

There are considerations that make these judicial remedies ineffective. In addition to potentially not being able to afford an attorney, some complainants may face a language barrier, preventing them from filing a complaint, judicial or non-judicial. Others may also be unlikely to have the necessary information available to make a formal complaint against a CBP official who violates his or her constitutional rights.\textsuperscript{185} Furthermore, it is debatable as to whether relief under the FTCA precludes relief under Bivens, meaning that litigants are not entitled to double recovery against the federal government.\textsuperscript{186} Moreover, the FTCA’s jurisdiction does not extend to constitutional violations since a private party would not be liable

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{184} Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. \\
\textsuperscript{185} See generally Hing, supra note 138 (raising such issues). \\
\textsuperscript{186} See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (2014); Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1438 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a litigant who pursues remedies under Bivens and the FTCA can receive both only if the former judgment is entered first); Serra v. Pichardo, 786 F.2d 237, 242 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 826 (1986) (holding that double recovery is not allowed); Ortiz v. Pearson, 88 F. Supp. 2d 151, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[T]he FTCA expressly bars a plaintiff from recovering damages against an employee of the government after securing final judgment on an FTCA claim arising out of the same facts."); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 616 (citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980)) (concluding that "Bivens suits [are] a ‘counterpart’ to the [FTCA] because the [FTCA] creates liability for the federal government and a Bivens cause of action permits recovery from the officers,” thus allowing double recovery). Professor Erwin Chemerinsky hypothesizes that the FTCA imposes an election of remedies: suit cannot be brought against both the United States under the FTCA and against the individual employee under a Bivens cause of action. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 637.
\end{flushleft}
absent a violation of “conduct under the color of law.” In FTCA cases, the FTCA is the exclusive remedy for torts arising out of the act or omission of a federal government officer who acts within the scope of his or her employment, except for Bivens actions. If the US Attorney General notes that a federal employee was acting within the scope of employment “at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose,” the employee is granted immunity from suit, the United States is substituted for the employee, and the action proceeds as one against the United States. Individuals should consider all of these practical considerations before filing a complaint.

2. Good Faith Immunity

Federal officers, such as CBP agents, may also be protected by the statutorily authorized “good faith” immunity. The “good faith” standard will usually be dispositive of whether a certain litigant can recover against a federal officer. The “good faith” standard “must strike a balance between protecting the officer’s exercise of discretion, while still compensating and deterring violations of federal law.” The key difference between qualified immunity and good faith immunity is the particular standard applied. That is, qualified immunity is an objective standard while good faith immunity is a subjective standard. It is also safe to say that the standard for both doctrines is significantly different for claims arising out of allegations of racial profiling at CBP checkpoints. In such situations, claimants have to prove that the actions taken by CBP agents “had a discriminatory effect, and were motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” Moreover, “[i]n order to prove discriminatory

187. JEFFRIES ET AL., supra note 156, at 24 (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477–78 (1994) (“[T]he United States simply has not rendered itself liable under § 1346(b) for constitutional tort claims.”)).
189. Id. § 2679(d)(2).
190. 19 U.S.C. § 482(b) (2014). For an enlightening analysis of the good faith immunity doctrine at the time of its enactment, see Saylor, supra note 146, at 292–98 (noting that “good faith” could apply based on an official’s reliance on operating procedures, departmental procedures, supervisory instructions, and regulations).
191. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 546.
192. Id.
193. Saylor, supra note 146, at 291–92 (citing Tapley v. Collins, 211 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2000)).
194. See Adams, supra note 22, at 360 (noting that at the international border, searches are invalid if “motivated by consideration of race, for the purpose of delay, or a manifestation of ill-will”).
195. Saylor, supra note 146, at 299 (citing Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197, 204–05 (3d Cir. 2002)).
effect[,] the claimant has the burden of showing that he or she is a member of a protected class and that he or she was treated differently from similarly situated individuals in an unprotected class."\textsuperscript{196} Thus, absent direct evidence or compelling circumstantial evidence of discriminatory purpose, such a standard is unlikely to be satisfied, and a CBP agent will not be liable.\textsuperscript{197} This immunity would arise in situations where individuals claim they were discriminated against for their Hispanic appearance.

So while the majority in \textit{Martinez-Fuerte} dismissed Justice Brennan’s concerns by noting that the “courts would not be powerless to prevent the misuse of checkpoints to harass those of Mexican ancestry,”\textsuperscript{198} individuals do, in fact, face substantial barriers in seeking relief following an improper checkpoint stop.

\textbf{IV. REFORM POST-\textit{MARTINEZ-FUERTE}}

Given the foregoing discussion, several proposals may assist in reaching a balance between implementing effective law enforcement procedures at checkpoints and preserving fundamental constitutional protections. To be clear, this Note only proposes solutions to improve these checkpoints’ effectiveness by imposing an oversight factor that has been lacking since their inception. Such proposals arise in the context of previous legislation introduced in 2014 intended to oversee CBP’s operations, including those at the checkpoints.\textsuperscript{199} This same piece of legislation, House Bill 4303, also promised to make CBP more inclusive with border communities.\textsuperscript{200} House Bill 4303 died in committee when the 114th Congress was introduced in 2015. Congress could reintroduce House Bill 4303, but the new legislation must acknowledge proposals the original bill did not.\textsuperscript{201}

\begin{itemize}
\item[196.] Id. (citing Bradley, 299 F.3d at 206). Realistically, however, should a motorist choose not to pursue judicial avenues for relief, the CBP agent who allegedly engaged in misconduct will continue to be employed and may subsequently engage in similar conduct. \textit{See id.} at 299–300; \textit{see also} Hing, \textit{supra} note 138, at 773–74.
\item[197.] Nonetheless, some have been successful against CBP outside of litigation. \textit{See} Apuzzo & Schmidt, \textit{supra} note 33 (noting that in 2013, CBP settled “a racial-profiling lawsuit in which Washington State residents accused border agents of racial profiling while making traffic stops near the Canadian border”).
\item[200.] Id. § 452(d)(3).
\item[201.] Two brief solutions that warrant further consideration are (1) “\textit{know your rights}” booths near checkpoints and (2) “Border Patrol Academies” for the general public. \textit{See} Press Release, Am. Civil
A. CBP Ombudsman Proposal

House Bill 4303 proposed creating an Ombudsman to monitor checkpoint operations. In 2014, Border Patrol conducted operations at 136 stations, 5 substations, and 35 permanent checkpoints, all within 20 sectors.202 These numbers did not account for temporary or “tactical” checkpoints operated in these same sectors. The Ombudsman’s primary duty would be to record statistics on individual checkpoints and compile a report to determine the cost-effectiveness of the checkpoints. “Costs” go beyond those that are merely tangible; they include intangible costs such as the loss of inclusivity and community, a loss of respect for the Constitution, and a biased implementation of selective law enforcement procedures on a certain group of individuals. The cost-benefit tool can be broken down into several inquiries. First, the Ombudsman would analyze CBP’s budget from DHS. In fiscal year 2014, CBP received an annual budget of $13.9 billion.203 Thereafter, the Ombudsman could determine how much money each checkpoint sector received and in turn how much money went to funding individual checkpoints in each sector. Clearly then, one solution is for the Ombudsman to request and monitor how much is being spent at each checkpoint by sector to determine costs.204

Substantively, the Ombudsman could track law enforcement statistics by focusing on the following key questions, each split by three categories: (1) by sector, (2) at permanent checkpoints, and (3) at temporary checkpoints. First, what is the annually recorded number of undocumented

---

203. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2014 2 (2015), available at http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CBP_DHS_2014%20PAR_508C.PDF. Take for example operations conducted in the Southwest sectors, including Tucson, San Diego, and the Rio Grande Valley—locations with the highest activity. In fiscal year 2014, the Southwest Sectors staffed a total of 18,156 CBP employees. UNITED STATES BORDER PATROL, SECTOR PROFILE: FISCAL YEAR 2014 1, 4 (2015). The Southwest Sectors also apprehended a total of almost 480,000 undocumented immigrants of Mexican ancestry, both juveniles and adults. Id. The Southwest Sectors also intercepted a combined total of over 1.9 million pounds of Marijuana and Cocaine, 9205 ounces of Heroin, and 3771 pounds of Methamphetamine. Id. 92,000 of those cases were actually prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s office. Id. Additionally, the Southwest Sectors intercepted 475 firearms, which were, presumably, unregistered, over 63,000 rounds of ammunition, and just under $7.4 million in currency. Id. at 4. With these statistics already available to the public, it is simply a matter of keeping tabs on individual checkpoints when reporting statistical data.

204. See LYALL ET AL., supra note 52, at 17 (recommending a cost-benefit analysis to be conducted on the checkpoints). Even current CBP commissioner R. Gil Kerlikowske said he was interested in analyzing the checkpoints through cost-effective lens. See Ortega, supra note 7.
immigrants apprehended at a checkpoint? Second, what is the annually recorded number of narcotics apprehended at a checkpoint? Third, what is the annually recorded number of unregistered firearms apprehended at a checkpoint? Fourth, what is the annually recorded number of human traffickers apprehended at a checkpoint? Fifth, what is the annually recorded number of miscellaneous unlawful activities prevented at a checkpoint? Finally, what is the annually recorded number of complaints filed against CBP agents at a checkpoint?

The Ombudsman could utilize this cost-benefit tool every year and publish a report reflecting a three-year performance period.

The Ombudsman’s role may not be difficult to implement. The Ombudsman could mimic the PHP Study and require that representatives physically monitor the checkpoints. One issue that could arise with this procedure is the distance the monitors are allowed to stand from CBP agents. Monitors should not interfere with a CBP agent’s duties; they should only observe what the agent is doing from a reasonable distance. Another way to track this data is to collect press releases CBP already publishes per checkpoint periodically. 205 In addition to its reporting role, the Ombudsman can also serve an advisory role in assuring that CBP complies with the law. This includes the issuance of advisory opinions and legal memoranda on a periodic basis or, alternatively, upon request by CBP. These procedures do not intrude into CBP’s operations as much as a physical presence, and are exemplary examples of comity in practice between CBP and the Ombudsman.

Finally, the Ombudsman would present his or her three-year report to CBP officials, DHS officials, and Congress to ultimately determine whether some checkpoints fare better than others.

But the implementation of an Ombudsman may be unrealistic. According to Professor Stephen Legomsky, at the time House Bill 4303 was proposed, it was “very unlikely” to pass congressional muster. 206 During the 113th Congress’s tenure, both House and Senate Republicans were “strongly opposed” to a provision that would have created an “Ombudsman for Immigration-Related Concerns.” 207 The Ombudsman provision in Senate Bill 744 would have similarly contained various investigative, monitoring, and advisory functions concerning CBP

---

206. E-mail from Stephen H. Legomsky, Law Professor, Washington Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (Feb. 5, 2015, 12:58 CST) (on file with author).
207. Id. (citing S. 744, § 1114, 113th Cong. (2013)).
operations. Contextually, a comprehensive immigration bill that includes dramatic increases in enforcement resources is unlikely to be favorable with Republicans. Currently, with a Republican-controlled Congress, and in a climate that has become even more hostile to immigrant-friendly legislation, “the chances of Congress enacting a law designed to monitor the operations of the immigration enforcement agencies have shrunk even further.” Republicans are unlikely to cut back on their tough stance on immigration enforcement, thus, House Bill 4303 or a mirror image of the legislation is unlikely to be introduced in the 114th Congress and even the 115th Congress if the Republicans continue to control the House and Senate. Such an anti-reformative view would only continue to make Republicans a less attractive party to Hispanic voters. Nonetheless, an Ombudsman may be part of a solution that would appear reasonable to both sides of the checkpoint debate.

B. CBP Complaint Forum Proposal

House Bill 4303 also provided protection to persons who are reluctant to file a complaint for fear of retaliatory actions by law enforcement officials. A similar concept should be implemented, especially if the Ombudsman’s office comes to fruition. A complaint mechanism would not use information the complainant alleges against a CBP agent in any removal or criminal proceeding against the complainant, even if the person violated US immigration laws. This provision could encourage potential complainants to come forward and report harassing and abusive CBP conduct.

Furthermore, as Professor Hing noted, due to the language barrier and inaccessible forum for making complaints, a new complaint mechanism through the Ombudsman should provide a multilingual complaint procedure that is accessible online and would be visible at interior

---

208. Id. 209. Id. 210. Id. 211. Border Enforcement Accountability, Oversight, and Community Engagement Act of 2014, H.R. 4303, § 452(f)(2), 113th Cong. (2014). 212. See id. An analogous provision in future proposals could prove problematic, especially for those already reluctant to place oversight on CBP. Opponents of the provision could argue that, for policy reasons, those who violate the law should not be allowed to go free. 213. Id. 214. See Hing, supra note 138, at 765–78. 215. H.R. 4303 § 452(d)(7)(C). CBP has “not adopted a consistent, uniform process for filing complaints, and do[es] not make complaint forms available in Spanish, such that many individuals do not submit formal abuse complaints.” LYALL ET AL., supra note 52, at 5, 16. The CBP Integrity
checkpoints. Any implemented complaint procedure should be externalized, not further internalized by CBP’s current bureaucracy.

C. Community Sticker Program Proposal

In addition to the previously discussed proposals set forth in House Bill 4303, several supplemental proposals may address issues with the current procedures at checkpoints following Martinez-Fuerte. For instance, CBP could consider implementing a Community Sticker Program (“CSP”). CSP could emulate CBP’s current “SENTRI” program implemented at international borders. “SENTRI provides expedited CBP processing for pre-approved, low-risk travelers. Applicants must voluntarily undergo a thorough biographical background check against criminal, law enforcement, customs, immigration, and terrorist indices; a 10-fingerprint law enforcement check; and a personal interview with a CBP Officer.” Upon approval, individuals are issued Radio Frequency Identification (“RFID”) cards that identify their residency status on CBP’s database once at a port of entry. Through the RFID cards, “the system automatically identifies the vehicle and the identity of the occupants of the vehicle.”

Like SENTRI, CSP would require local residents to go through a screening process in order to qualify for admission to the program. Once admitted, residents would receive a blue sticker that must be placed on the windshield. The sticker would reflect the maximum number of people allowed in the vehicle, with each person individually registered in the CSP database. For instance, if the registrant initially registered his or her family of six, only six people could be in the car when arriving at the checkpoint.


216. H.R. 4303 § 452(d)(7)(C).
219. Id. SENTRI is unavailable to certain individuals, including, but not limited to, those who provide false or incomplete information during the screening process, those who have been convicted of a crime, and those who have violated US immigration laws. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Perhaps CBP could even consider using RFID cards at checkpoints.
If there were any more than that upon a plain view inspection, the point officer could then question the vehicle’s occupants.

Another tier of CSP would be what Chief Justice Warren Burger posited at oral argument in *Martinez-Fuerte*. CBP agents at international border stations would place a bright orange sticker on cars crossing from abroad into the United States. CBP could mandate that the sticker remain on the car windshield for forty-eight hours. If a car arrives at the checkpoint with the bright orange sticker, agents would automatically refer the car to secondary for inspection. A car without a bright orange sticker or one with a blue sticker would not be subject to inspection.

Obviously this program has its setbacks; it potentially opens the door to fraud—for example, removing the sticker and placing it on another person’s car or substituting legal residents for undocumented immigrants. Thus, CSP would make it easier for those individuals who are legally present in the country to transport undocumented immigrants since a CBP agent would not be required to question a vehicle in compliance with the blue sticker or a vehicle without a bright orange sticker on the windshield. Moreover, the sticker program could also make it much easier for individuals to smuggle narcotics and other illegal materials within the United States, again because a CBP agent would be unlikely to stop a vehicle in compliance with the blue sticker or one without a bright orange sticker.

Individuals with a sticker on their car (whether blue or bright orange) can easily remove the sticker and bypass the checkpoint unless CBP designs a sticker or device that can only be removed by CBP. Any sign of tampering with the sticker or device (perhaps during an annual renewal of one’s CSP membership) would be suspect and cause CBP to launch an investigation into the matter. Thus, while certain defects in CSP could undermine the program altogether, CBP needs to close such gaps and make it clear that anyone who willfully circumvents the screening process or abuses the program shall be sanctioned.


224. Non-fraudulent considerations would be transactional costs on CBP for producing the stickers and for ordering agents on duty at the international border to place the stickers on the large volume of cars coming from Mexico and Canada.
D. A Supreme Court Fix?

The final solution to the checkpoint conundrum hails from the judiciary. A Supreme Court fix may perhaps be what clarifies the underlying role checkpoints play within the United States. In order to avoid the trap the Martinez-Fuerte defendants fell into, a future litigant before the Supreme Court should not engage in unlawful activities, such as transporting undocumented immigrants or narcotics. The Martinez-Fuerte defendants engaged in such unlawful activities and thus the justices were not persuaded by their arguments.

The Supreme Court recently avoided addressing the complexities of the checkpoint operations. In March 2010, Richard Rynearson, a major in the United States Air Force, was stopped at a checkpoint in Uvalde County, Texas.\(^{225}\) When Mr. Rynearson arrived at the checkpoint, the point officer asked if he owned the vehicle he was driving.\(^{226}\) Answering in the affirmative, the point officer referred Mr. Rynearson to secondary.\(^{227}\) No CBP agent had inquired about Mr. Rynearson’s citizenship.\(^{228}\) At secondary, Mr. Rynearson refused to completely open his car window.\(^{229}\) CBP agents later requested that Mr. Rynearson provide identification.\(^{230}\) Mr. Rynearson complied, placing his driver’s license and military identification between the window glass and the door’s weather stripping, which allowed CBP agents to reasonably read from the outside of the vehicle.\(^{231}\)

Thereafter, a CBP agent asked Mr. Rynearson to step out of his car.\(^{232}\) Mr. Rynearson refused and asked why he was being detained.\(^{233}\) The CBP agent responded that he intended to determine Mr. Rynearson’s citizenship and that he would be free to go thereafter.\(^{234}\) Mr. Rynearson continued to refuse, requesting that the agent explain what his “reasonable suspicion” was, to no avail.\(^{235}\) The CBP agent stepped away to find a supervisor, while Mr. Rynearson added his passport to the window glass along with


\(^{226}\) Id.

\(^{227}\) Id.

\(^{228}\) Id.

\(^{229}\) Id.

\(^{230}\) Id.

\(^{231}\) Id.

\(^{232}\) Id.

\(^{233}\) Id.

\(^{234}\) Id.

\(^{235}\) Id.
his driver’s license and military identification. Later, another CBP agent asked Mr. Rynearson for his passport and the name of his commanding officer; Mr. Rynearson refused to furnish his commanding officer’s identification. Thereafter, the CBP agent took Mr. Rynearson’s passport, verified his citizenship, and allowed him to leave. Mr. Rynearson’s total time at the checkpoint was approximately thirty-four minutes.

Following the incident, Mr. Rynearson filed an administrative claim with the border patrol in accordance with the FTCA, seeking $500,000 in damages arising out of the checkpoint stop. The border patrol denied his claim, and he filed an action in federal district court. Mr. Rynearson’s complaint alleged negligence, false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and several violations of Mr. Rynearson’s constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Mr. Rynearson’s complaint also requested Bivens relief from the agents, in their individual capacities, for a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Mr. Rynearson’s claims were dismissed at the district court level, and no appeal was taken thereafter. The district court ruled, among other things, that the CBP agents were entitled to qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit only reviewed Mr. Rynearson’s Bivens actions arising out of the Fourth Amendment.

After reviewing his appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court, and held that Mr. Rynearson did not have a “clearly established” right, under the Fourth Amendment, to refuse to cooperate with CBP agents at a checkpoint. The Fifth Circuit noted that a “routine interior immigration checkpoint stop conducted without reasonable suspicion does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” Moreover, “[b]order patrol agents at interior checkpoints may stop a vehicle, refer it to a secondary inspection area, request production of documents from the vehicle’s occupants, and

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 305–06.
249. Id. at 304 (citing United States v. Martinez–Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561–62 (1976)).
question the occupants about their citizenship."  

The Court noted that the CBP agents did not violate Mr. Rynearson’s constitutional rights, but rather “made reasonable but mistaken judgments when presented with an unusually uncooperative person, unusual at least in the facts described in any of the caselaw.” The court did not consider whether Mr. Rynearson could refuse to cooperate with CBP due to his Fourth Amendment protections. Rather, the court ruled that the CBP agents were entitled to qualified immunity against Mr. Rynearson’s claims because “no constitutional right of which all reasonable officers would have known was violated.”

Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod, however, disagreed with the majority. In her dissenting opinion, she noted that the “clearly established” law the CBP agents violated was the “Fourth Amendment when they . . . detain[ed] [Mr. Rynearson] beyond the time reasonably necessary to investigate his citizenship status.” After a denial of rehearing en banc, Mr. Rynearson petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari. On March 21, 2016, the Supreme Court denied his petition.

While Rynearson was the closest case to address the Martinez-Fuerte conundrum, a future case may go much farther than Rynearson would have. Surely, in Rynearson, the discussion would have focused on whether the checkpoints are still limited to the Martinez-Fuerte framework (i.e., to be used solely for immigration inquiries, as opposed to broader law enforcement practices). Rynearson, however, would have not addressed the constitutionality of the “Mexican ancestry” criterion since Mr. Rynearson did not raise the issue on appeal, and even if he did, he would lack standing to do so since he is not of “Mexican ancestry.” The Supreme Court has not overruled Martinez-Fuerte, and thus the “Mexican ancestry” criterion remains valid. Someone other than Mr. Rynearson may challenge the criterion on equal protection grounds arising out of the Fifth Amendment. Such a challenge would allege that Hispanics are subject

250. Id. (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562–63).
251. Id. at 305.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 306 (Elrod, J., dissenting).
256. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs state action, not federal conduct by a federal agency like CBP. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that equal protection requirements apply to the federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
to abuse and harassment at the checkpoints at staggering rates while non-Hispanics are not. An equal protection analysis would not look at the initial stop, because everyone is stopped. Rather, such an analysis would look at the secondary stop, which is much more selective given the “Mexican ancestry” criterion used in *Martinez-Fuerte*.

The Court may be persuaded to grant certiorari in a future challenge to the checkpoint operations given the current circuit split over the scope and length of non-immigration related inquiries at checkpoints. 257 Currently, three federal circuits with, presumably, the largest immigration dockets, all agree that once a checkpoint detention procedure exceeds the permissible immigration inquiry per *Martinez-Fuerte*, further detention is justified only if CBP agents have developed a minimum level of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 258 The issue is at what point does detention at a checkpoint become impermissible. The circuits seem divided on whether CBP agents may convert an immigration-related inquiry into a non-immigration related inquiry, especially without a minimum level of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 259 Thus, if all else fails, a Supreme Court solution could solve the checkpoint conundrum by granting certiorari in a future challenge to the checkpoint operations in the interest of clarifying *Martinez-Fuerte* and its progeny.

**CONCLUSION**

Many Americans are unaware of the militaristic procedures that occur every day at CBP checkpoints within the United States. As previously mentioned, such procedures, along with the current status of the law, have left many questions unanswered, such as whether a functional equivalent to an international border operates differently than the international border itself. Administrative reform, congressional reform, and a future ruling by the Supreme Court could all resolve these unanswered questions. Such reforms should take effect in that order. The checkpoint problem is not just

257. See S. Ct. R. 10(a) (noting that the Court may grant certiorari when “a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter”).

258. See, e.g., United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 434 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Massie, 65 F.3d 843, 848 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Taylor, 934 F.2d 218, 220 (9th Cir. 1991).

259. See, e.g., *Rynearson*, 601 F. App’x at 302–04 (allowing CBP agents to inquire into matters unrelated to immigration enforcement); United States v. Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d 749, 752 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that brief inquiries into limited matters such as vehicle ownership must be “reasonably related” to immigration enforcement); *Taylor*, 934 F.2d at 220 (allowing brief inquiries into immigration-related matters and allowing for plain view inspections of vehicles).
a southwestern issue, but an American issue, because innocent, law-abiding citizens’ constitutional rights are being undermined within US borders.

But completely banning checkpoints from the United States should be off the table. An open border system, like that in the Schengen Area of Europe,\(^{260}\) carries a tremendous risk to national security. Rather, the federal government must continue to recognize the utility of operating checkpoints while simultaneously recognizing that the checkpoints now advance much broader interests. In 1976, checkpoints were designed to solely curtail the flow of undocumented immigration from Mexico, but now counterterrorism and drug-trafficking prevention are cognizable law enforcement functions. Threats to national security no longer solely come from abroad; they may also come from within the United States. The bottom line is that the federal government needs more information, and it can obtain that information by implementing a cost-benefit analysis of checkpoint procedures on a national scale. While this empirical research is being conducted, judicial grievances should not be ignored, but such grievances are merely a Band-Aid to the more inherent issue of whether all checkpoints are being used effectively without substantially infringing on the constitutional rights of many. The courts may be called upon to determine whether checkpoints are still being operated within the scope of the Supreme Court’s holding in *Martinez-Fuerte*. If they are not being operated within the scope of *Martinez-Fuerte*, and given the various interests at play, should the *Martinez-Fuerte* scope be broadened to cover those interests, and if so, who should broaden that scope: Congress, CBP, or the courts?

While the Southwest presently serves as the focal point for these procedures, one can only speculate how far the federal government will expand these checkpoint operations while the federal judiciary continuously defers to CBP’s discretion. While CBP checkpoints have served, and will probably continue to serve, a compelling government interest by preventing the transportation of drugs, undocumented immigrants, and firearms, the effectiveness of each individual checkpoint

ought to be scrutinized in order to preserve fundamental constitutional rights where they presumably are applied in the highest regard: within the United States.

Jesus A. Osete*

* J.D. (2016), Washington University in St. Louis; A.B. (2013), University of Arizona. My sincerest gratitude goes out to my colleagues at the Washington University Law Review. At the apex of that pool of talent, my gratitude particularly goes to Tessa Castner, Alec Moen, Jonathan Adair, Colin Stapleton, John Gauthier, Jenny Terrell, Taylor Widawski, Galen Spielman, and Kam Ammari. Moreover, I thank Professor Stephen Legomsky for his contributions to this Note (happy retirement!). Finalmente, le doy gracias a Dios por bendecirme con tantas oportunidades y a mi familia por apoyarme.