More on Subjective Intent: A Response to Professor Cunningham


This Article is divided into three parts. The first part discusses what I believe to be the essential difference between the "pure possession" view of adverse possession, which Professor Cunningham endorses, and the law as I believe it has been applied in the majority of recent American cases. The second part covers in detail the criticisms Professor Cunningham makes of the reasoning and the descriptions of the case law in my original article. The third part raises three broader issues relating to scholarship on the law of property. My aim in this response has thus been: first, to vindicate the conclusions of the initial article, and second, to raise some important questions about the legitimate tasks and responsibilities of legal commentators.


Adverse possession, Subjective intent



Richard H. Helmholz (University of Chicago)



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