Creek Railroad Co. v. United States,[23] he sustained the "recapture" clause of the Transportation Act of 1920 as a valid exercise of the commerce power for the purpose of building up a system of railways "prepared to handle promptly all the interstate traffic of the country." Chief Justice Taft and some of his brethren broke judicial precedent by working actively for statutory changes which would enable the court to keep abreast of its work. These efforts bore fruit in the act providing for twenty-four new district judges and setting up the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges presided over by the Chief Justice and in the act[24] giving the Supreme Court by the use of *certiorari* the authority to say what cases might come before it.[25] Within a few years, the court was able to report annually that its work was "current."

Mr. Pringle at no point attempts a comprehensive analysis of the character and achievements of the central character of his narrative; but the attentive reader may see a pattern take form. There is a striking consistency in Taft's methods of procedure, whether undertaken as administrator, statesman, or judge. He would always work from the home base, which he had thoroughly surveyed, into the unknown, consolidating the new territory after each advance and not losing contact with the point of departure. Secondly, he would continue to advance; for quiescence was not a part of his universe and retreat seldom required. In the comparative freedom of his academic life at Yale, he had assumed national leadership in promoting the "League to Enforce Peace," and a few years later gave President Wilson valiant support when its central idea was embodied in the League of Nations. In this, his one seemingly idealistic project, he was inconsistent, for as a lawyer he was keenly aware of the historic process by which law and the courts had been progressively substituted for force; and he believed that the same substitution might gradually be made in the realm of international relations. The qualities and methods heretofore attributed to Mr. Taft are not enough for the person who would lead a people in a great cause or conduct an army into battle. Happily America's affairs are such that the need for such talents is only occasional.

In writing these volumes, Mr. Pringle has performed a work of distinction. He has not only written interesting history but has made a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the problems of various public offices. That the volumes are attractive in appearance, printed in large clear type, and provided with an adequate index, are details which will add to the reader's pleasure.

EARL L. SHOUP.†

LAW, THE STATE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. By James Brown Scott. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939. Two volumes. Pp. xxiv, 613; vi, 401. $8.75.

The author of this work is concerned primarily with jurisprudence and

23. (1924) 263 U. S. 456.
24. September 14, 1922, 42 Stat. 838, 28 U. S. C. A. (1927) sec. 218.
25. February 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 938.

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political theory, with significant historical connections, and with the impact of all this on international law and morals. The first volume represents his own analysis; the second consists of excerpts from the writings of eminent legal philosophers of antiquity and the Middle Ages. These excerpts are placed chronologically within the tripartite classification indicated by the title. Perhaps they may be of some significance for students.

The first volume begins with the ancient Greeks and ends with Hooker (d. 1600). Most of the outstanding legal and political philosophers writing within these limits are included—though several notable exceptions come to mind. Professor Scott usually gives a short biographical sketch, then an outline of what he regards as the salient points, interspersed very liberally with long quotations from the work analyzed as well as from those of modern commentators thereon.

One can hardly call this treatise an original or stimulating study. The chapters on history are easily the best of the lot. On the jurisprudential side there is an unbroken paean of "Natural Law" with not even the suggestion of a critical note. Although this reviewer is sympathetic with the author's general views and ideals, he does not conceive the task of the legal philosopher to be adoration but, on the contrary, analysis and enlightenment. The furtherance of jurisprudence will not be served by rote and repetition. In such affairs a single well-conceived paper is worth a ton of indiscriminate quotation. This is not to say that this work is without value —especially, perhaps, for students of political science and international law. As jurisprudence, it is disappointing, to say the least, especially to expectations raised by a knowledge of Professor Scott's substantial and scholarly contributions in the realm of international law.

JEROME HALL.†

HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES. By Gustavus H. Robinson. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1939. Pp. xiii, 1025. $5.00.

The author of this book, G. H. Robinson, deserves the praise of the practitioner and student alike for this scholarly treatise on the subject of Admiralty. It is a permanent contribution to a subject which has not received "the frequent treatment accorded to other branches of law."[1] The mechanical features of the book, i. e., Table of Contents, Table of Cases and Index, are very comprehensive and arranged in a manner to permit the user to find his objective with the minimum loss of time. The outline and the concise statement of rules of law found at the beginning of each chapter are other commendable features of the book. The simple, yet unequivocal, language and phraseology employed by the author greatly enhance the usability of the book and enable the reader more readily to acquire a better understanding of the basic principles of law. This last comment is made in light of the apparent and ever increasing tendency of writers and judges to clutter their opinions with flowery language which serves only the per-

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1. P. vii.