MY CREDITOR’S KEEPER: 
ESCALATION OF COMMITMENT AND 
CUSTODIAL FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
IN THE VICINITY OF INSOLVENCY

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ABSTRACT

Fiduciary duties in the vicinity of insolvency form a notoriously murky area where legal space warps. Courts openly acknowledge that it is difficult to identify its boundaries, and the content of these duties is equally uncertain and inconsistent across jurisdictions. This Article expands the theoretical basis for a special legal regime in virtually or liminally insolvent firms. In addition to the conventional rationale of opportunistic risk shifting, lawmakers should be mindful of managers’ tendency to unjustifiably continue failing projects, known as escalation of commitment. Second, this Article addresses the substantive content of a duty to protect creditors, either as in the form of a duty to consider creditors’ interest or as the statutory rule against wrongful (or insolvent, or reckless) trading. Specifically, it argues that when these duties are enlivened at the very edge of the zone of insolvency, the mission of directors should transform from entrepreneurial to custodial and should include a trustee-like duty of caution.

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INTRODUCTION

In several common law systems, creditors of corporate debtors enjoy legal protections beyond what their contracts with those companies afford them. These protections cover both large and small creditors, voluntary and involuntary creditors alike. These protections derive from duties imposed on directors and other corporate fiduciaries by common law or by statute that call for considering and sometimes promoting creditors’ interests before the latter take over the company through formal bankruptcy proceedings. This stage is metaphorically described as the “vicinity” or “zone of insolvency.”

The vicinity-of-insolvency duties form a notoriously murky area where legal space warps. The contours of this area are fuzzy. Courts openly acknowledge that it is difficult to identify clear guideposts for the threshold at which these duties are enlivened. The content of these duties is equally uncertain and conceptually inconsistent across jurisdictions. At one end of the spectrum, Delaware law denies the legal existence of a zone of insolvency, thus relieving itself—and purportedly, also directors—of the need to consider creditors’ interests outside of insolvency. At the other end, Canadian law locates shareholders’ and creditors’ interests at the same level, assigning neither priority a priori. In this view, creditors constitute one stakeholder constituency among several, including shareholders and employees, whose interests directors should balance. Somewhere in a notional middle ground, the laws of countries like the United Kingdom and Australia struggle to give concrete content to the duty to consider creditors’ interest in the vicinity of insolvency.
The goal of this Article is two-fold. First, it expands the theoretical basis for a special legal regime in virtually insolvent or liminally insolvent firms. To explain and justify special fiduciary duties to consider creditors’ interests, lawyers usually point to the danger of opportunistic high-risk behavior by managers on behalf of shareholders. I argue that this account may be sound but is nonetheless lacking. In addition to such opportunism, lawmakers should also be mindful of managers’ tendency to unjustifiably continue failing projects—a practice known as escalation of commitment. Unlike opportunistic risk shifting, for which empirical evidence is surprisingly sparse, escalation of commitment is an irrational behavior that has been widely documented and studied but has been largely neglected by legal scholars.

Second, this Article addresses the substantive content of the duty to protect creditors where such duties are recognized, either in the form of a duty to consider creditors’ interest or as the statutory rule against wrongful (or insolvent, or reckless) trading. I maintain that when these duties are enlivened—arguably, at the very edge of the zone of insolvency, close to actual insolvency—the mission of directors should transform from entrepreneurial to custodial. That is, they should implement strategies that aim to preserve the firm—in working condition, to the extent possible, with a view to resuming regular business—but avoid seeking new projects with a view toward maximizing profits. This could mean that the shield of the business judgment rule may not be available to the same extent as in regular circumstances. The Covid-19 pandemic that swept the globe in 2020 provides a fresh context for this approach and underscores the need to implement such a regime sensibly, with high deference to business decisions even if outside the scope of the business judgment rule.

The Article proceeds as follows. Part I addresses the role of creditors as corporate stakeholders and its legal implications for directors’ duties to promote the company’s interests. Next, it briefly reviews the problem of anti-creditor opportunism and presents the possibly bigger problem of escalation of commitment. Part II sets forth the custodial duties in the vicinity of insolvency. Part III provides a comparative analysis of creditor-oriented duties in several common law jurisdictions and examines how these jurisdictions could implement a custodial approach. Part IV concludes.

I. CREDITORS AS AN ENDANGERED SPECIES

The common wisdom in corporate finance and corporate law points to conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors and notes that the latter are vulnerable to abuse by the former. These tensions are often
described as an “agency problem,” and the resulting losses are sometimes called “agency costs of debt.” These are misnomers, however. Unlike managers, who are agents for the company and indirectly for shareholders, shareholders do not stand in the same position vis-à-vis creditors as agents or fiduciaries of the latter.\(^1\) There is no mission or project that creditors entrust to shareholders, and shareholder-appointed managers do not work for or on behalf of creditors. It is more accurate therefore to refer to “opportunistic behavior” by shareholders through company managers and to the detriment of creditors in the Williamsonian sense—namely, by exploiting transaction costs of contract formation, information asymmetry, vulnerability due to specific investment, etc.\(^2\)

To see the source of creditors’ vulnerability, consider a basic setting, in which shareholders appoint managers to operate the firm for profit and enjoy limited liability such that creditors have recourse only to the company’s assets, the company being a separate legal entity.\(^3\) This setting assumes that only property law and contract law apply (i.e., no fiduciary duties); the shareholder-manager agency problem is assumed away for convenience.\(^4\) Several mechanisms could then be utilized to make creditors bear non-priced business risk after the credit terms—particularly, the interest rate—have been set. Assuming that higher business risk is accompanied by higher expected returns, when the company is virtually insolvent shareholders enjoy the upside of increased risk without being fully exposed to its downside, which is borne by the creditors.

The literature identifies three major risk-shifting mechanisms: asset dilution, claim dilution, and asset substitution.\(^5\) Asset dilution involves siphoning value away from the company, either legitimately (e.g., through

\(^1\) Nota bene: with regard to creditors’ interest and not, or not necessarily, to creditors directly. In line with standard legal convention, I take directors’ duties to be owed to the corporation.


\(^4\) In a more skeletal setting, an individual takes debt from creditors. The debtor-creditor opportunism analysis is similar, but we are here interested in director duties.

\(^5\) The terminology for each of these mechanisms varies in different accounts but the different labels mean the same thing for each mechanism. Some authors distinguish additional mechanisms—for example, Smith and Warner, supra note 3, at 119 (discussing underinvestment).
dividend payouts) or illegitimately (e.g., through self-dealing, also known as “tunneling”).

When creditors seize a company upon default and insolvency, the remaining assets do not match the risk they bargained for. Claim dilution works similarly to diminish the scope of the collateral available to creditors upon default, but instead of depleting the company’s assets it increases its liabilities by taking on more debt—again, beyond what the creditors have envisaged and priced. Finally, asset substitution stands for post hoc changes in the firm’s line of business—specifically, by entering into higher-risk-higher-return projects. In the now-less-likely event that those projects succeed, shareholders will garner the higher rewards, while creditors become more likely to end up with whatever scraps that remain in the company upon liquidation.

The effect of all of these mechanisms is the same—namely, exploitation and frustration. However, because risk shifting as described above is rather straightforward, most creditors realize its prospects and take measures to hedge against it by adjusting credit terms. There is ample evidence that, beyond setting interest rates in line with foreseeable risks, resourceful creditors design loan contracts (debentures) to accommodate particularly pertinent risks with appropriate covenants, security interests, and so forth. Moreover, participants in certain debt markets appear to identify and price such covenants and penalize corporate debtors for breaching these obligations, thus providing incentives for optimal contracting and compliance. In fact, there is surprisingly little evidence that corporate debtors can successfully engage in opportunistic risk shifting to extract value from creditors. The available empirical evidence relates largely to publicly traded debt instruments. While there is evidence for increased risk taking, evidence for risk shifting is sparse. Such risk shifting appears to

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6. See Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, AM. ECON. REV., May 2020, at 22; Vladimir Atanasov, Bernard Black & Conrad S. Ciccotello, Law and Tunneling, 37 J. CORP. L. 1 (2011); see also Kristin van Zwieten, Director Liability in Insolvency and Its Vicinity, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 382, 385 (2018) (in a review of U.K. cases, finding that actions based on a duty to consider creditors have served as a substitute for a preference—i.e., “tunneling”—action).


take place only in limited circumstances. In summary, while risk shifting may not be a myth, its actual severity is unclear at this stage.

The persuasive power of the risk-shifting account is so compelling that lawyers have bought whole-heartedly into it. This is especially the case as firms engage in unbridled asset substitution by embarking on high risk projects and claim dilution by taking on new debt, possibly because illicit asset dilution is covered by a battery of legal doctrines against self-dealing and fraudulent conveyances. Paul Davies thus opined:

[O]nce the shareholders’ equity has been dissipated, or has been reduced to a very low level, and there is no prospect of its being rebuilt through the company’s established business model, the incentive for company controllers (if acting in the shareholder interest) is to take on excessively risky projects, for their attention can focus exclusively on the potential upside of decisions.


Non-Permanent Judge (formerly a Justice of the High Court of Australia), writing for the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, also adopted Davies’s analysis.¹⁴

As empirical evidence on risk shifting is starting to accumulate, some legal authors have also begun to pay attention to the empirical challenge and note that that evidence does not fully support the risk-shifting account as a major source of concern.¹⁵ In tandem, there also seems to be a consensus that small and involuntary creditors—in particular, trade and tort creditors, respectively—cannot fully hedge against risk shifting and thus remain vulnerable to shareholder opportunism.¹⁶ These modes of shareholder opportunism are less amenable to rigorous empirical testing by financial economists.

II. Eскаlаtіоn оf Cоmmіtmtеnт

When a project that has consumed substantial resources fails to deliver or to progress as planned, its managers face a dilemma: should they invest additional resources in the hope that it reaches fruition or should they discontinue it and declare failure? Continuing a struggling project could reflect perseverance, resolution, and determination—sticking to one’s guns—but it could also stem from managerial failure to face reality and act on current information, sticking one’s head in the sand. Managers and shareholders of companies in the vicinity of insolvency face precisely this type of dilemma.

As noted in the preceding section, the legal discourse on creditors as corporate stakeholders focuses on risk shifting such that legal policy is guided by basic economic theory, common sense, and mostly anecdotal evidence. This section aims to enrich the analytical framework by pointing to escalation of commitment as a potent factor in the dynamics of business.


¹⁵. Some authors have pointed out the empirical question. See, e.g., Armour et al., supra note 3, at 111 n.9; Gurrea-Martínez, supra note 13, at 726 n. 39 (citing Gilje, supra note 10); Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez, Towards an Optimal Model of Directors’ Duties in the Zone of Insolvency: An Economic and Comparative Approach 7 n.15 (Sin. Mgmt. Univ. Sch. of L., Research Paper No. 22, 2020).

¹⁶. For a few exceptions that have pointed the particular vulnerability of tort creditors in the general context of limited liability, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991).
Escalation of commitment has been largely overlooked by legal scholars thus far, despite its pertinence to designing legal policy for the vicinity of insolvency.\textsuperscript{17} It is submitted that escalation of commitment poses an equal, if not greater, challenge than risk shifting does to optimal regulation of companies in looming or virtual insolvency.

Escalation of commitment refers to a broad phenomenon, in which decision makers adhere to a failing project despite strong indications that it should be aborted. Introduced in a seminal 1976 article by Barry Staw,\textsuperscript{18} escalation of commitment has since been studied in hundreds of articles.\textsuperscript{19} It is primarily an individual-level phenomenon linked to personal attributes such as biases in decision making. But escalation of commitment also varies with context, including organizational context and societal-level factors.

People tend to remain married to their original choices and to commit resources to them even when it is no longer rational for them to do so. Behavioral scientists have identified several psychological factors that influence this tendency. The sunk cost fallacy is a prime factor. Although economic theory teaches that investment decisions should focus on future gains or losses, in actuality, people take non-recoupable past expenditure into account as a consideration for remaining invested or even continuing to invest rather than pulling the plug. Falling prey to the sunk cost fallacy has been related to personal motivation to avoid negative feelings associated with acknowledging failure and loss.\textsuperscript{20} Camerer and Weber note that although escalation of commitment and the sunk cost fallacy are essentially


the same phenomenon, escalation is broader, as forms of commitment other than previous economic expenditures could drive it—e.g., a verbal commitment. They empirically find that irrational escalation exerts an effect beyond the effects that are attributable to rational factors. Self-justification is another factor that has been related to escalation of commitment. In this view, the need to protect one’s self-identity could motivate the person who made the original decision may to escalate. Self-presentation theory offers a related factor, in that decision makers adhere to prior decisions notwithstanding negative information in order to avoid the embarrassment of admitting a mistake. More generally, people have been found to escalate in order to avoid the associated negative affect (bad feelings such as anger, regret, anxiety, etc.). Last but not least, rational, agency-type self-interestedness could also motivate escalation.

Escalation of commitment is ubiquitous. In addition to experimental settings, it has been observed and studied in organizations large and small, in business corporations and in the public sector. Importantly for the present context, owner-managers, family firms, and venture capital firms exhibit escalation of commitment when the firm is on the verge of failure.

24. See Joel Brockner, Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Elaine Lang, Face-saving and Entrapment, 17 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 68 (1981). Slessman et al. 2012, supra note 19, at 543, mentions several other individual-level accounts, which have gained lesser attention in subsequent research.
Considerations of personal and family pride exacerbate the tendency to escalate in these settings, and family owners in fact become more resolute in prolonging the life of their ailing firms. Entrepreneurs in particular have been shown to be prone to escalate. Theory suggests that a higher proportion of qualified outside directors could help firms to de-escalate, especially in family firms, as these directors may be less prone to commitment. The evidence, however, indicates that


outside directors may not be effective in reducing escalation pressures.\textsuperscript{32} Having decisions made by groups (rather than by individual managers) or increasing the diversity of decision-making teams alone does not appear to avoid escalation traps.\textsuperscript{33}

From a comparative perspective, escalation of commitment varies across cultures. Because it is anchored in individual behavioral tendencies and in societal situational conditions, one should expect that cultural stances should moderate (that is, to either enhance or attenuate) the intensity of escalation. Cultural values provide implicit guidance about accepted and expected behavior that could enhance or inhibit individual tendencies. Cross-cultural analyses usually examine such variation along cultural dimensions—namely, fundamental themes about which cultures have different stances that can be measured and compared in dimensional models.\textsuperscript{34}

Salter and his colleagues tested the effects of agency and self-justification theories on escalation of commitment in a sample of managers from nine countries (Canada, China, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Singapore and the United States).\textsuperscript{35} Using Hofstede’s dimensional model,\textsuperscript{36} these authors observe that cultural individualism intensifies the effect of agency on escalation behavior such that escalation is more likely to occur in high-individualism countries.\textsuperscript{37} This, in turn, suggests a need for

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\textsuperscript{32} See Westphal & Bednar, supra note 30, at 287. Outside directors might actually increase conformity in the board in certain circumstances. See generally Park et al., supra note 30.
\textsuperscript{33} See Sleesman et al. 2018, supra note 19, at 183.
\textsuperscript{36} See GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES, BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS (2d ed. 2001).
\textsuperscript{37} Hofstede’s cultural individualism stands for valuing loosely knit social relations, in which individuals are expected to care only for themselves and their immediate families, in contrast with
stronger risk management systems in locations and organizations that are characterized by individualism.

In the present context, the extant evidence on individualism suggests that, in the latter, individualistic, countries, there could be a more pressing need and justification for legal intervention to thwart escalation in financially distressed companies. In this view, for instance, highly individualistic countries such as the United States would do better to reject rather than embrace Debtor-in-Possession (“DIP”) arrangements, in which incumbent managements of insolvent firms remain at the helm throughout bankruptcies. In contrast, lower-individualism countries could implement DIP arrangements with lesser fear that they would be exploited by incumbent managers to escalate—even if unconsciously—until their firms collapse. As a matter of practice, however, non-English-speaking Western European (read: European) countries score lower on Hofstede’s individualism than English-speaking ones, but these differences are modest in comparison to non-Western (read: Asian) countries. This suggests that one need not exaggerate the putative effects of cultural differences in connection with designing legal policy in light of this factor.

Salter and his coauthors also found that managers in long-term-oriented countries—typically, East Asian countries—are more likely to escalate projects with long-term consequences than those with only short-term effects. A study by other researchers found that Chinese managers have a greater preference to continue unprofitable projects than their U.S. counterparts due to greater aversion to admitting failure in a collectivist culture and thereby losing face. In addition, there are inconclusive

cultural collectivism, which connotes tightly knit relations, in which people can expect their wider in-group (e.g., extended family or clan) to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.

38. English-speaking countries, and especially the United States, tend to rank higher on Hofstede’s individualism. See HOFSTEDE, supra note 36, at 215. I abstract here from the issues of using countries as proxies for cultures and of grouping countries into cultural regions. For discussions, see Licht 2018, supra note 34; Sjoerd Beugelsdijk, Tatiana Kostova & Kendall Roth, Commentary, An Overview of Hofstede-Inspired Country-Level Culture Research in International Business Since 2006, 48 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 30 (2017).

39. Hofstede’s long-term orientation dimension refers to a dynamic, future-oriented culture that emphasizes values like persistence (perseverance) and thrift; the opposite pole of this dimension, short-term orientation, connotes cultural emphasis on values like personal steadiness and stability and respect for tradition. See Tony Fang, A Critique of Hofstede’s Fifth National Culture Dimension, 3 INT’L J. CROSS CULTURAL MGMT. 347 (2003).

findings on the effect of Hofstede’s cultural uncertainty avoidance,\textsuperscript{41} which tends to be higher in English-speaking countries, on escalation of commitment, possibly due to the small sample (two-country) comparisons. \textsuperscript{42} The latter findings thus confirm that escalation of commitment behavior responds to social normative cues, at least informal ones, but it appears that they are too preliminary at this stage to offer a clear direction for legal policy formation.

Given that individuals and teams are prone to escalate, the practical challenge is to facilitate de-escalation—namely, shutting down the project or winding up the firm with a view to salvaging what could be saved. According to Chulkov and Barron,

[\textsuperscript{r}]esearch on the escalation of commitment provides strong support for the personal responsibility effect that contributes to escalation as long as the original decision makers are involved in the continuation of investment decisions. Studies on reversing escalation of commitment, or de-escalation, conclude that breaking the cycle of escalation decision errors is facilitated by a change in management.\textsuperscript{43}

Change in management is thus the primary mode of breaking out of the escalation trap. Beyond changes in management, additional factors that could facilitate de-escalation include, argue Chulkov and Barron, “better information on costs and benefits of the project, regular evaluation and monitoring of projects, clear criteria for success and minimum target performance levels,” and “clear feedback about underperforming projects.”\textsuperscript{44} Such measures will have limited efficacy, however, as long as the information they generate is interpreted and acted on by decision-makers who have initiated the failing project and even by different persons who are nonetheless related to those decision-makers.\textsuperscript{45} Change in management is

\textsuperscript{41} Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance refers to feeling uncomfortable or comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity and therefore valuing or devaluing beliefs and institutions that provide certainty and conformity.


\textsuperscript{44} Id. at 2538 (citing studies).

\textsuperscript{45} See Brian C. Gunia, Niro Sivanathan & Adam D. Galinsky, Vicarious Entrapment: Your Sunk Costs, My Escalation of Commitment, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1238 (2009); see also Woods et al., supra note 27.
therefore not only primary; it is essential. Without explicitly referring to escalation of commitment, the Supreme Court of New Zealand recently recognized the danger that it poses and insisted on the need to address it by changing the makeup of the decision-making body in the company:

The removal of decision-making powers from directors in such circumstances is a recognition that directors are not the appropriate decision-makers in times of insolvency or near-insolvency. This is because their decisions may be compromised by conflicting interests and, even where that is not the case, they may be too close to the company and its business to be able to take a realistic and impartial view of the company’s situation. 46

All of the formal mechanisms have carefully worked out processes for decision-making and involve either an independent person or consultation with all affected creditors. None of these formal regimes involve continued unfettered decision-making by directors. Rather, “[d]irectors can choose to employ informal mechanisms but these must align with formal mechanisms.” 47

III. CUSTODIAL DUTIES IN THE VICINITY OF INSOLVENCY

This Part presents a framework for conceptualizing legal responses to virtual or liminal insolvency; namely, when firm failure is a virtual reality or very nearly so absent some radical development. It is submitted that there could be a reason in such situations to mandate a change of strategy from entrepreneurial to custodial. An entrepreneurial strategy is profit-oriented and principally shareholder-focused. In contrast, a custodial strategy could involve seeking return on investment but is premised on caution. It underscores preservation, protection of existing assets, and loss-minimization, and is often creditor-focused. The following section reviews the custodial duties of trustees and especially their distinctive duty of caution. Next, I discuss the implementation of such custodial duties by adopting custodial strategies in business firms.

The analysis in this Part is conceptual and positive, and—in the following Part—comparative. I do not make a strong normative claim about the desirability of imposing a duty to implement such strategies. Legal systems differ on the mode of regulating the zone of insolvency such that imposing such a duty might not be compatible with their general approach.

46. Madsen-Ries v. Cooper [2020] NZSC 100, at [43], per Glazebrook J.
47. Id. at [49].
There are sound justifications for doing so, however, in systems that do recognize the zone of insolvency as a legally relevant circumstance.

A. Custodial Duties of Trustees

While owing a similar duty of undivided loyalty to their beneficiaries, trustees and corporate directors differ fundamentally in the nature of their core assignment. Conventional trust funds should provide for the needs of the beneficiaries, whereas business corporations invest in risky projects with inherently uncertain returns. In *Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.*, Chancellor Allen thus contrasted the responsibilities of trustees and directors:

> [T]rust law differs from corporate law. In general, the duties of a trustee to trust beneficiaries (those of loyalty, good faith, and due care), while broadly similar to those of a corporate director to his corporation, are different in significant respects. Corporate directors . . . will often be required to take risks with the assets they manage. Indeed, an unwillingness to take risks prudently is inconsistent with the role of a diligent director. The trustees [sic] role is, classically, quite different. The role of the trustee is prudently to manage assets placed in trust, within the parameters set down in the trust instrument. *The classic trusteeship is not essentially a risk taking [sic] enterprise, but a caretaking one.*

The content of the trustee’s duty as a caretaker has evolved over generations and took its modern shape around the turn of the millennium. Historically, during its early stages of development in England between the late thirteenth century and early sixteenth century, the trust transformed from a purely passive custodial device into a more discretionary instrument that authorized and required trustees to manage the trust fund. Getzler notes that while “active trust management became a structural element of the modern trust by the start of the seventeenth century . . . . such active duties were not fundamental to the basic function of the trust, which remained a custodial device segregating the entrusted assets from creditors of the legal owners . . . .” Those assets comprised mostly real property, which required a limited amount of oversight and active management, and trustees were typically friends and members of the family who operated

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49. See Joshua Getzler, *Duty of Care, in BREACH OF TRUST* 41, 43 (Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto-Sakmann eds., 2002), on which the following draws.
50. *Id.* at 44.
without remuneration for their services. Socioeconomic developments primarily during the nineteenth century have changed much of that, however. In the latter part of that century, many trust funds included financial assets that required management, and trust services by non-professional solicitors began to emerge. The new circumstances engendered concomitant legal developments.

Two seminal U.K. cases have formed the framework for trustees’ duties of investment. In Speight v. Gaunt (1883), the House of Lords held that “as a general rule a trustee sufficiently discharges his duty if he takes in managing trust affairs all those precautions which an ordinary prudent man of business would take in managing similar affairs of his own.” Shortly thereafter, in Learoyd v. Whiteley (1887), the House of Lords elaborated:

[A trustee] is not allowed the same discretion in investing the moneys of the trust as if he were a person sui juris dealing with his own estate. Business men of ordinary prudence may, and frequently do, select investments which are more or less of a speculative character; but it is the duty of a trustee to confine himself to the class of investments which are permitted by the trust, and likewise to avoid all investments of that class which are attended with hazard.

Speight and Whiteley together stand for two related propositions that retain their viability despite substantial developments since they were rendered. The first proposition may be called the “prudent person rule”; the second, the “no hazard rule.” The prudent person rule sets the benchmark for assessing the qualifications required from a reasonable trustee to handle a sizeable trust fund. This rule comprises two (again, related) sub-rules—one addressing her financial proficiency and another one addressing the knowhow she is expected to utilize in managing the trust. Much has changed with regard to both issues between the late nineteenth century and today. The paradigmatic person has changed from the “prudent man (of business),” who could be a volunteer family or friend or a remunerated but financially amateur professional, into the “prudent investor,” who is versed in and can utilize current knowledge in financial economics. Their respective knowhow has changed as well—from lay intuitions and familiarity with

52. Speight v. Gaunt (1883) LR 9 App Cas 1 (UKHL) 19 (Lord Blackburn), aff’d (1883) LR 22 Ch D 727 (EWCA (Civ)) at 739–40 (Jessel MR) (“[O]n general principles a trustee ought to conduct the business of the trust in the same manner that an ordinary prudent man of business would conduct his own . . . .”).
53. Learoyd v. Whiteley (1887) 12 App Cas 727 (UHKL) 733 (Lord Watson) (emphasis added).
inflexible rules of appointment about permissible investments into Modern Portfolio Theory, which calls for using diversification for tailoring different risk/return profiles to the needs of the beneficiaries without a priori ruling out certain assets as too risky. This massive transformation has now been partially codified; it is extensively covered in the literature; and will not occupy us much further.

The second, the “no hazard rule,” has received relatively lesser attention than the prudent man/investor rule has, but it is the one of most interest here. Whiteley and the “no hazard rule” it expresses continue to inform contemporary trust law. U.K. courts continue to cite Whiteley as authority, either directly or indirectly, through other seminal cases that rely on it. So do courts in Australia. Reflecting a similar approach, U.S. trust law imposes a duty to exercise caution as part of a larger set of the trustee’s custodial obligations “to safeguard, preserve, or protect the trust assets and the safety of the principal.” The Restatement on Trusts distinguishes this duty from the duty to have skill and exercise care:

In addition to the duty to use care and skill, the trustee must exercise the caution of a prudent investor managing similar funds, in similar circumstances, for similar purposes. [T]his requirement of caution requires the trustee to invest with a view both to safety of the capital and to securing a reasonable return.

54. See, e.g., Trustee Act 2000, c. 29, § 1 (U.K.); Pensions Act 1995, c. 26, § 36 (U.K.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (AM. L. INST. 2007) (U.S.). With appropriate authorization in the trust instrument, modern trustees can employ financial tools that enable them to take on substantial risks that are still deemed manageable, provided they are appropriate for the beneficiary. See UNIF. PRUDENT INV. ACT § 2 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1994) (U.S.) (“The Act impliedly disavows the emphasis in older law on avoiding ‘speculative’ or ‘risky’ investments. Low levels of risk may be appropriate in some trust settings but inappropriate in others.”).


57. See Elder’s Tr & Ex’r Co Ltd v Higgins [1963] HCA 48, [29].

58. 76 AM. JUR. 2D TRUSTS § 402 (2021) (footnotes omitted).

59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2007); see also id. § 77 (a trustee must exercise “reasonable care, skill, and caution.”). Note that “the duty of caution does not call for avoidance of risk by trustees but for their prudent management of risk. . . . [A]lthough an inferred,
This duty of caution, “to avoid all investments . . . which are attended with hazard” as Whiteley put it,\(^60\) is unique to trustees, distinguishing them from corporate directors. This obligation defines trustees as caretakers, whereas directors are business managers. While both actors control other people’s assets with a view to generating income, there is a fundamental difference between their core missions. In managing the trust fund, trustees must exercise substantive care; they must take reasonable precautions to avoid loss, especially capital loss, although they need not and cannot insure against such loss. Diversification is the primary tool with which trustees are expected to achieve this goal. In contrast, genuine business managers engage in entrepreneurship. They seek to capitalize on uncertainty inherent in unique ideas, combinations, and opportunities.\(^61\) Conservatism or caution, including by way of risk-reducing diversification, are anathema to entrepreneurship and therefore to business management.\(^62\) Shareholders should expect (and cannot complain, legally) that directors invest all of the company’s resources in a single idiosyncratic venture with highly uncertain returns. In line with this basic difference in their core missions, judicial review of trustee care and of directors’ care also differs. Managerial discretion of trustees is subject to substantive judicial review akin to implementing the duty of care of other professionals.\(^63\) In contrast, the exercise of discretion in business should be reviewed with respect to its general duty to invest conservatively is a traditional and accepted feature of trust law, that duty is necessarily imprecise in its requirements and is applied with considerable flexibility.” Id. § 90 cmt. e(1).\(^60\)

\(^60\) Learoyd v. Whiteley (1887) 12 App Cas 727 (UHKL) 733 (Lord Watson).


\(^62\) This does not relieve corporate directors from the responsibility to manage risks that are foreseeable and avoidable as part of their duty of oversight, which is analogous to trustees’ duty to protect the fund from external threats. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). In tandem, note that with appropriate authorizing provisions in the settlement deed, trusts today may be used for conducting regular business activities. The present analysis thus focuses on more traditional wealth management trusts.

\(^63\) The key feature of substantive judicial review of decisions made by professionals who handle risky situations—medical doctors come to mind—is that there exist conventions and accepted practices for addressing particular circumstances in light of their known risk parameters. Medical treatment may entail taking risks and could end in failure but is nonetheless based on protocols and procedures that have been vetted by experts. Failing to take such measures thus could be deemed unreasonable and thus negligent, unlike business decisions for which there is no protocol for achieving success.
process under the business judgment rule, leaving the substantive decision essentially immune. 64

B. Caution and De-escalation in the Vicinity

The review of escalation of commitment provided in the preceding Part reveals a powerful, tenacious factor that bears directly on the vicinity of insolvency conundrum. The currently dominant account of risk shifting is premised on rational responses to economic incentives. One must never under estimate the potency of economic incentives for opportunistic behavior, and the present paper does not purport to do so. Opportunistic risk shifting thus remains a relevant consideration for legal policy design, but as noted, the evidence suggests that its severity should not be overstated. 65 It is an elegant theory with thus far little evidence to support it. Crucially, risk shifting differs from escalation of commitment in that the former is more susceptible to market discipline and to self-regulation by contract, even if not perfectly so, as the available empirical evidence indeed suggests. 66 The need for legal intervention is therefore more limited: primarily to situations in which creditors cannot reasonably fend for themselves (e.g., tort creditors).

Escalation of commitment, in contrast, being largely detached from rational calculations, presents a more compelling justification for legal regulation—and a more interventionist one, at that. In this view, managers—especially owner-managers—of virtually insolvent firms may not enjoy the usual level of deference that the law affords to their business judgment in regular times, as their discretion at that point is prone to be clouded by a misplaced motivation to stay the course, weather the storm, and similarly-sprited no-quitting notions. Optimal law for situations of liminal insolvency consequently may need to mandate a change of course, order entering into a safe harbor, require a change of the people at the helm, or, eventually, call for docking the enterprise. If water is flooding the ship, threatening to sink it, its captains should focus on stabilizing it, or finding a shelter, or handing over the helm to somebody else, rather than on breaking

64. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 655–57 (2004); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (“[S]ubstantive due care’ . . . [is] a concept [that] is foreign to the business judgment rule . . . Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due care only.”). The doctrine of waste, which used to be treated as a substantive exception to the business judgment rule, is now more accurately conceptualized as the doctrine of fiduciary duty of loyalty. See SEPTA v. AbbVie, Inc., No. 10374–VCG, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110, at *1, *48 n.114 (Del. Ch., 2015), aff’d, 132 A.3d 1 (Del. 2016).
65. See supra note 10.
66. See supra note 7.
speed records—even if that was the original purpose of the voyage. Current knowledge about escalation of commitment supports concerns that these captains likely will fail to do so on their own volition such that there could be a need to force them to do that.

Adopting a duty of caution by analogy from trust law can provide a framework for regulating the conduct of corporate fiduciaries in liminal insolvency situations in legal systems that wish to impose special rules for such circumstances. When this duty is triggered, directors should change their management strategy from entrepreneurial to custodial and operate as caretakers for the firm. This change of strategy would discharge the duty to consider creditors’ interests that some legal systems impose. Creditors’ only legitimate interest is in having their debts serviced, and—in the vicinity of insolvency—in preserving the value of the debt. Sometimes this could mean ceasing trading immediately; in other cases, this could mean continuing trading while incurring new debts. New and even higher indebtedness in and as of itself is not necessarily in conflict with creditors’ interest. The crucial issue is whether the strategy that guides the firm addresses their interest. A custodial duty of caution does exactly that, as it focuses on preserving a source of income over a long period while seeking to maximize its value subject to this overriding constraint.

Importantly, a duty of caution in the vicinity of insolvency is not inimical to shareholders’ interests either, at least insofar as shareholders care about the viability of the firm and are not agnostic to its collapse (e.g., if they are highly diversified). For many entrepreneurs and certainly for many owner-managers of small companies, such an attitude seems at least as plausible as the wild “bet the farm” scenario that informs the common economic account of asset substitution (and is not baseless itself). When escalation of commitment is factored into the analysis, a duty of caution makes even greater sense, as it forces managers to pull the plug on the entrepreneurial project, they have been committed to but is now failing. Without a clear change in the content meaning of directors’ responsibility for corporate strategy—namely, what they expected to do in a given setting or their “job description”—there is only little hope that calls for a “rescue culture” would engender actual rescues of distressed firms.

Accepting in principle that there is room for a duty of caution in the vicinity of insolvency, several secondary issues then arise. First, should the custodial caretaking strategy replace the entrepreneurial strategy of business of regular times, or should it guide directors in tandem with the latter? This

67. “Bet the farm” is an informal phrase describing a very high stake, often desperate, gamble on the entire enterprise, homestead, etc.
question is equivalent to asking whether directors should focus only on creditors’ or on shareholders’ interests or should they balance the interests of these two constituencies somehow. Framing the question as one of business strategy and a concomitant legal obligation points, I believe, to the dichotomous approach as the preferred one. Creditors’ interest must replace shareholders’ interest as the focal object of corporate strategy. One could adopt a high- or low-risk entrepreneurial strategy or, similarly, a high- or low-risk caretaking strategy, but it is difficult to implement both of them at the same time as they seek to achieve incompatible goals. Moreover, because judicial review of such strategies differs in fundamental respects, as noted above, it is hard to see how a “mixed strategy” could be subject to a unitary judicial review. If I am wrong, however, such that the two approaches could be implemented in a mixed mode, there could also be room for balancing the interests of shareholders and creditors in the vicinity of insolvency. We return to this point in the comparative analysis below.

Second, at what stage should this duty arise? That is, what degree of financial distress short of certain insolvency should enliven the duty? Relatedly, what should be the criteria for assessing such distress (e.g., balance sheet and/or liquidity solvency), and at what level of confidence about such distress should directors decide to shift gears and move into protective mode to comply with the duty of caution? In principle, every business faces some probability of failure and will occasionally tread into the periphery of the zone of insolvency in that insolvency would be a non-negligible contingency that could nonetheless be avoided with appropriate strategic measures. In certain industries, moreover, the probability of failure is so substantial that insolvency is more likely than not from the outset. Overall, only about half of new small businesses make it beyond the five-year mark. In hi-tech and bio-tech start up projects that are financed by venture capital, the company is insolvent by design until a very late stage, in which it either succeeds or, more often than not, is wound up and liquidated. Surely that does not mean that entrepreneurs should avoid

68. See supra text accompanying notes 63–64.

69. Recall that entrepreneurial business management enjoys the protection of (essentially, immunity under) the business judge rule, whereas custodial, caretaking, and trustee management is subject to substantive judicial review.

70. High likelihoods of failure of new startup businesses characterize both high-tech and low-tech ventures. On the bright side, it is a myth that most restaurants fail in their first year. See Tian Luo & Philip B. Stark, Nine out of 10 Restaurants Fail? Check, Please, SIGNIFICANCE, Apr. 2015, 25, 28; Kristin Pryor, Here Are the Startup Failure Rates by Industry, TECH.CO (Jan. 12, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://tech.co/news/startup-failure-rates-industry-2016-01 [https://perma.cc/5PV-4-H367].

71. Venture capital firms are not immune to escalation of commitment. See Devigne, supra note 27.
starting new businesses in those industries in general or shut down the business when it reaches its half-life while still buoyant. Moreover, shifting to custodial creditor-oriented strategy is a major decision that cannot be taken lightly nor easily reversed. Effecting such a strategic move does not operate on a gradient. Rather, it is a binary shift akin to changing the firm’s main business model (e.g., from making widgets to servicing them) and probably even more profound.\textsuperscript{72} Bearing in mind that coping with financial distress does not in and of itself justify abandoning the entrepreneurial strategy, it seems that a duty of caution should be triggered only at a very late stage, in liminal insolvency (or any synonym with an equivalent effect)—namely, at the very edge of the zone of insolvency close to insolvency, not in the penumbra of the zone. But, again, this is a point on which legal minds can differ and has been subject to extensive judicial analysis without a clear conclusion thus far, as the comparative analysis below indicates.

A third issue concerns the persons who should implement the custodial strategy under the duty of caution. Here, a broad menu of approaches is available. At one end, the law could entrust the caretaking responsibility with the directors who have been running the firm until that point, in line with the U.S. DIP mechanism, which leaves the directors of a bankrupt firm in place. A large literature discusses the DIP mechanism as a means to facilitate restructuring of struggling companies, but the empirical evidence about its effectiveness is equivocal.\textsuperscript{73} From an escalation-of-commitment perspective, however, there is reason to doubt that DIP could be effective notwithstanding other considerations such as the desire to avoid over deterrence of managers.\textsuperscript{74} Legal policy that takes escalation of commitment into account would rather strive to replace the existing managers with ones who are not committed to the failing project or could at least reinvigorate the incumbent management team. Appointing an external advisor to the top management team on behalf of creditors—especially one whose advice is

\textsuperscript{72} I am grateful to Aidan Browoleit for helping clarify this point. As a practical matter, managers would want to document their deliberations over assessing the situation and their eventual decision in order to demonstrate how they discharged their duties, should failure occur and judicial review follow.

\textsuperscript{73} This literature is beside the present scope. For empirical studies see, for example, Barry E. Adler, Vedran Capkun & Lawrence A. Weiss, \textit{Value Destruction in the New Era of Chapter 11}, 29 J. L. ECON. & Org. 461 (2013); Avner Kalay, Rajeev Singhal & Elizabeth Tashjian, \textit{Is Chapter 11 Costly?}, 84 J. Fin. Econ. 772 (2007); Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu, \textit{The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation Versus Chapter 11 Reorganization}, 61 J. Fin. 1253 (2006).

\textsuperscript{74} See Adler et al., supra note 73 (arguing that managers’ influence over the decision to file a bankruptcy petition results in a delay in filing and a reduction of asset value).
like a command like a Chief Restructuring Officer (“CRO”) — could provide a compromise solution.75

Legal policy for the zone of insolvency is less clear, however. On the one hand, the firm is not yet bankrupt and there is still a chance that it could trade its way out of financial distress. On the other hand, that chance would be maximized if it were exploited by decision makers who are less likely to fall prey to escalation of commitment. Crucially, as long as creditors do not take over the company through formal insolvency proceedings, the directors remain shareholder-appointed and thus harbor allegiance to them regardless of formal legal obligations. In smaller firms, shareholders and directors often overlap, making it even more challenging to require them to shift (or split) their focus to creditors’ interest. As noted above, forced changes in the composition of management teams, particularly by adding independent professionals, could facilitate de-escalation.76 A potentially promising approach for implementing a custodial duty of caution with extant directors thus could compel them to consult with an external expert, especially with regard to restructuring, akin to a CRO. Such an expert could more effectively cause the directors to acknowledge reality and de-escalate by shifting to a caretaking strategy with the hope to resume entrepreneurial business in the future.

IV. CARING FOR CREDITORS ACROSS COUNTRIES

Legal systems around the world exhibit significant variation with regard to directors’ duties to protect creditors’ interests, especially when the company is nearing insolvency and in particular, when the company appears to be doomed for insolvency. Legal approaches run the gamut from denying all protection beyond those provided by contract to fully equalizing the status of creditors to that of shareholders and other stakeholders. When law leverages fiduciary duties for the protection of creditors in such circumstances, these duties vary from a strict injunction to file for bankruptcy to a requirement to endeavor to minimize creditors’ losses to a vague duty to consider creditors’ interest.77 This Part reviews a sample of

76. See supra text accompanying note 30–31.
77. In considering this menu, one should also keep in mind other bankruptcy doctrines. Bankruptcy laws are part and parcel of every corporate governance system such that there cannot be a clear-cut distinction between them and fiduciary duties, for instance. On such “insolvencification” of corporate governance in the European Union, see Martin Gelter, Centros and Defensive Regulatory Competition: Some Thoughts and a Glimpse at the Data, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 467 (2019); Marek Szydło, Directors’ Duties and Liability in Insolvency and the Freedom of Establishment of Companies
such approaches from common law jurisdictions and examines the extent to which they could harness a custodial duty of caution to address the escalation of commitment problem. First, the two extreme positions in the United States and Canada are noted. Next, I proceed to more nuanced versions found in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.

A. The United States

U.S. law—at least Delaware law—endorses the strongest version of shareholder primacy. 78 Under current doctrine, only the interest of shareholders as a constituent group can be the objective of Delaware corporations. According to the seminal decision in Guth v. Loft, “[c]orporate officers and directors . . . stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders.” 79 Repeated in numerous occasions since it was formulated, this doctrine was solidified in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, where the Delaware Chancery Court stated that “[d]irectors of a for-profit Delaware corporation cannot deploy a rights plan to defend a business strategy that openly eschews stockholder wealth maximization—at least not consistently with the directors’ fiduciary duties under Delaware law.” 80 Writing extrajudicially, former Delaware Chief Justice Strine argued that “[d]espite attempts to muddy the doctrinal waters, a clear-eyed look at the law of corporations in Delaware reveals that, within the limits of their discretion, directors must make stockholder welfare their sole end, and


79. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); see also Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (citing Guth, 5 A.2d at 510) (“The directors of Delaware corporations stand in a fiduciary relationship not only to the stockholders but also to the corporations upon whose boards they serve.”).

80. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2010).
that other interests may be taken into consideration only as a means of promoting stockholder welfare."\textsuperscript{81} 

\textit{Guth} is uniquely shareholder focused in two respects. First, it refers to shareholders as direct beneficiaries of directors’ fiduciary duties, in parallel with the corporation, and thus seemingly bypasses the latter’s separate legal personality. Second, \textit{Guth} considers the interests of the corporation and of stockholders as perfectly overlapping. The upshot is that the interests of all other stakeholder groups are necessarily excluded inasmuch as they are not aligned with shareholders’ interests or else the directors risk falling into a disabling situation akin to a dual-fiduciary situation even if not formally so.

This logic guided the Delaware Supreme Court’s landmark decision in \textit{Gheewalla}.\textsuperscript{82} Prior to \textit{Gheewalla}, Delaware law held that “upon insolvency, the beneficiaries of the directors’ fiduciary duties shifted from the corporation’s stockholders to its creditors, and that after insolvency directors had a fiduciary obligation to preserve value for the benefit of creditors”—a “trust fund doctrine [that] would resemble English law.”\textsuperscript{83} This doctrine “included an obligation to manage the corporation conservatively.”\textsuperscript{84} Then there followed a period of legal ambiguity due to Chancellor Allen’s famous dictum in \textit{Credit Lyonnais}, which suggested a multiple-stakeholder enterprise approach to directors’ duties in the vicinity of insolvency.\textsuperscript{85} That dictum engendered much discussion but was eventually rejected in \textit{Gheewalla}:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{81} Leo E. Strine, Jr., \textit{The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law}, 50 Wake Forest L. Rev. 761, 768 (2015). Strine was careful to distinguish his understanding of positive doctrine from his views on desirable law. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., \textit{Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism} (Univ. of Penn. Inst. for L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 19-39, 2019).
  \item \textsuperscript{82} N. Am. Cath. Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007).
  \item \textsuperscript{84} Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin, 115 A.3d 535, 545 (Del. Ch. 2015) (\textit{Quadrant II}) (Laster, V.C.).
When a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of insolvency, the focus for Delaware directors does not change: directors must continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders by exercising their business judgment in the best interests of the corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.86

Gheewalla is particularly noteworthy because the Court goes to great lengths “to provide the directors with clear signal beacons and brightly lined channel markers as they navigate with due care, good faith, a loyalty on behalf of a Delaware corporation and its shareholders.”87 So much so, that by drawing a sharp distinction between solvency and insolvency, it effectively denies as a matter of law the existence of a murky zone of insolvency, although in reality, vagueness and uncertainty characterize this setting.88 Directors of Delaware corporations consequently do not owe an obligation to implement a custodial (“conservative”) strategy with a view to protecting creditors’ interests, although they may do so with a view to promoting shareholders’ interest under the umbrella of the business judgment rule. A license to manage cautiously in the vicinity of insolvency, as opposed to a duty to do so, obviously is a much weaker protection against escalation of commitment.

B. Canada

While Delaware law renounces any recognition of nuance and ambiguity with regard to pre-insolvency creditor-oriented fiduciary duties, Canadian law wholeheartedly embraces ambiguity and uncertainty as it endorses the opposite approach. In essence, both Delaware and Canada ignore the vicinity of insolvency as a matter of practice, but while Delaware eliminates it as a matter of law, Canada comes close to locating every business decision in some proximity to insolvency, with concomitant implications for directors’ fiduciary duties. The Canada Business Corporations Act (“CBCA”) renders the corporation the nominal beneficiary of directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties.89 In tandem, the CBCA’s provision on oppression

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Wan Wongsunwai, Contracting and Reporting Conservatism Around a Change in Fiduciary Duties, 37 CONTEMP. ACCT. RSCH. 2472 (2020).

86. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101.
87. Id. (quoting Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998)).
88. See Quadrant I, 102 A.3d at 174 n.4 (“In Gheewalla, the Delaware Supreme Court discarded the zone . . . .”); Quadrant II, 115 A.3d at 546 (“There is no legally recognized ‘zone of insolvency’ with implications for fiduciary duty claims.”); Kirschner v. FitzSimons (In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conv. Litig.), No. 12-cv-2652, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204632, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018) (referring to “Gheewalla’s rejection of the ‘zone of insolvency’ theory”).
enumerates creditors among those entitled to a remedy against oppression. This has led the Supreme Court of Canada to adopt an open-ended stakeholderist doctrine. In considering a petition by institutional bondholders in BCE, the court held:

[T]he duty of the directors to act in the best interests of the corporation comprehends a duty to treat individual stakeholders affected by corporate actions equitably and fairly. There are no absolute rules. In each case, the question is whether, in all the circumstances, the directors acted in the best interests of the corporation, having regard to all relevant considerations, including, but not confined to, the need to treat affected stakeholders in a fair manner, commensurate with the corporation’s duties as a responsible corporate citizen.

Directors may find themselves in a situation where it is impossible to please all stakeholders. . . . There is no principle that one set of interests—for example the interests of shareholders—should prevail over another set of interests.

The BCE court thus put on the table what many have swept under the carpet. By using fairness rather than loyalty as the framework of analysis, BCE allows for conflicting interests to be balanced against one another. However, as the court candidly acknowledges, this ruling gives directors no guidance as to how they should resolve this dilemma and in fact notes that “the court looks beyond legality to what is fair, given all of the interests at play.” A 2019 amendment to the CBCA (re-)locates the issue within fiduciary duties, as it authorizes directors and officers to consider the interests of shareholders, employees, retirees and pensioners, creditors, consumers, and governments, the environment, and the long-term interests of the corporation. Consistent with BCE, this new provision does not prioritize any of these interests. It is thus silent about the strategy or mix of

92. Id at para. 71.
93. The new section, 122(1.1) of the Canada Business Corporations Act, as amended by the Budget Implementation Act, S.C. 2019, c 29 § 141 (Can.), resembles Peoples Department Stores Inc. v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, para. 42 (Can.) (“[I]n determining whether they are acting with a view to the best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment.”).
strategies that directors should implement and is agnostic to the vicinity of insolvency.

C. The United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand

The United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand present a complex, intermediate approach to creditor-oriented fiduciary duties, hereinafter referred to as the Anglo approach. Certain elements of this approach have evolved by way of cross-fertilization through judicial exchange of ideas among these jurisdictions such that despite substantial differences, it warrants analysis as a largely single approach. The Anglo approach has two prongs: first, a common law rule on directors’ duty to consider the interest of creditors that is viewed as applying to the vicinity of insolvency; second, a statutory provision that in different formulations and titles imposes personal liability on directors for failing to take action to protect creditors when the company is virtually insolvent. But before we look at these rules, a note on the benchmark approach to the objective of the company in these jurisdictions.

Company law in these jurisdictions is more loyal to the classical formula of fiduciary loyalty by making the company alone the beneficiary of directors’ fiduciary duties. Moreover, it has traditionally taken a comprehensive approach to the best interests of the company by referring to “the company as a whole.” While recognizing shareholders as the ultimate arbiters of corporate affairs, this formulation can accommodate different stances on who counts for the company’s best interests. The U.K. Companies Act 2006 preserves this approach. Section 172 of the Act is explicit in designating shareholders as the ultimate beneficiaries of the company’s business. In tandem, this section requires directors to consider other stakeholders, yet stakeholders’ interests are subordinated to the interests of shareholders. Corporation statutes in Australia and New

94. Certain elements of the Anglo approach can also be found in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Israel but will not be discussed here.


97. See Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 172(1) (U.K.) (stating that “[a] director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to—[. . .].”).

98. See, e.g., Andrew Keay, Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the United Kingdom’s ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach,’ 29 SYDNEY L. REV. 577 (2007); Georgina Tsagas, Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006: Desperate Times Call for Soft Law Measures,
Zealand do not have parallel provisions beyond the general fiduciary duty to manage the company in good faith, such that this point is governed by traditional common law.99

Against this backdrop, courts in these jurisdictions have developed a doctrine that requires directors to consider the interests of creditors, especially in the vicinity of insolvency. At a fundamental level, English law has long viewed the interest of creditors as limiting shareholders’ sovereignty over the company and, hence, also directors’ duty to manage it for their benefit. According to the famous In re Duomatic decision, the fully-informed unanimous consent of all shareholders can approve any breach of fiduciary duty, but that power is qualified so that such an action cannot harm creditors’ interest.100 In tandem, a more focused line of cases has developed a particular duty to consider creditors’ interest.101 According to standard historiography of this “consider thy creditor” doctrine,102 its early pronouncements emerged in Australia and New Zealand.103 In Nicholson v. Permakraft, Judge Cooke said:

The duties of directors are owed to the company. On the facts of particular cases this may require the directors to consider inter alia


100. See In re Duomatic Ltd. [1969] 2 Ch 365 at 373 (U.K.) (“[W]here it can be shown that all shareholders who have a right to attend and vote at a general meeting of the company assent to some matter which a general meeting of the company could carry into effect, that assent is as binding as a resolution in general meeting would be.”); see also In re Horsley & Weight [1982] Ch 442 at 454–56 (U.K.). For a recent restatement in the Privy Council, see Cihan Management Corp. v. Citco (BVI) Ltd [2020] UKPC 21 [40] (appeal taken from British Virgin Islands) (“One recognised qualification [holds] that the transaction must not jeopardise the company’s solvency or cause loss to its creditors . . . .”). An early pronouncement of this approach appeared already in Attorney General for Canada v. Standard Trust Co. of New York [1911] UKPC 37, AC 498 at 505; (Eng.). In Australia and New Zealand, see, respectively, Links Golf Tasmania Pty Ltd v Sattler (2012) 213 FCR 1, ¶583 (Austl.); Westpac Sec. Ltd v. Kensington [1994] 2 NZLR 555.


102. See Andrew Keay, Directors’ Duties and Creditors’ Interests, 130 L.Q. REV. 443 (2014) [hereinafter Keay, Directors’ Duties]; see also Andrew Keay, Formulating a Framework for Directors’ Duties to Creditors: An Entity Maximisation Approach, 64 CAMB. L.J. 614 (2005); Anil Hargovan & Jason Harris, For Whom the Bell Tolls: Directors’ Duties to Creditors After Bell, 35 SYDNEY L. REV. 433 (2013); Langford, supra note 99.

the interests of creditors. For instance creditors are entitled to consideration, in my opinion, if the company is insolvent, or near-insolvent, or of doubtful solvency, or if a contemplated payment or other course of action would jeopardise its solvency.\textsuperscript{104}

This idea gained momentum in the Australian case of \textit{Kinsela v. Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd (in liq.)}.\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Kinsela} was subsequently adopted in the English Liquidators of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v. Dodd.\textsuperscript{106} The U.K. Companies Act now codifies this obligation in section 172(3). In English law, \textit{West Mercia} spawned a whole body of case law, the content and contours of which are extensively debated.\textsuperscript{107} Keay, among others, has pointed out the fuzziness of this doctrine, especially with regard to the stage at which the duty to consider creditors’ interests is triggered, and, crucially, whether this duty, when it arises, operates in lieu of or in tandem with the duty to focus on shareholders’ interests, i.e., whether creditors’ interest becomes paramount to shareholders’ interests or not.\textsuperscript{108} The latter point goes to the heart of conceptualizing the purpose of the company as monist or a pluralist. Recent court of appeals decisions in several jurisdictions have adopted different views about this point such that it is anything but settled.\textsuperscript{109}

What has been largely neglected in this judicial and academic discourse is the \textit{manner} in which directors are to consider creditors’ interest if they

\textsuperscript{104} Nicholson v. Permakraft (NZ) Ltd., [1985] 1 NZLR at 249 (CA).
\textsuperscript{105} (1986) 4 NSWLR 722 (Austl.); see also Spies v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 603 (Austl.).
\textsuperscript{106} (1988) 4 BCC 30 (U.K.).
\textsuperscript{107} For a piercing critique of the basic doctrine see K.M. Hayne, Directors’ Duties and a Company’s Creditors, 38 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 795 (2014). Van Zwieten argues that the rule in \textit{West Mercia} has been applied in conventional circumstances of unlawful preferences or breach of fiduciary duties. See Kristin van Zwieten, Director Liability in Insolvency and Its Vicinity, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 382 (2018). For a discussion, see Andrew Keay, Financially Distressed Companies, Preferential Payments and the Director’s Duty to Take Account of Creditors’ Interests, 136 L.Q. REV. 52 (2020).
\textsuperscript{108} See Keay, Directors’ Duties, supra note 102, for a comprehensive review of authorities; see also Andrew Keay, Financially Distressed Companies, Restructuring and Creditors’ Interests: What Is a Director to Do?, 2019 LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 297.
\textsuperscript{109} See BTI 2014 LLC v. Sequana S.A. [2019] EWCA (Civ) 112 [222] (U.K.) (“[I]t is hard to see that creditors’ interests could be anything but paramount.”); Cooper v. Debut Homes Ltd. (in liq.) [2019] NZCA 39 at [26] (N.Z.) (“When a company is nearing insolvency, the interests of the company extends to encompass the interests of the company’s creditors.”); Westpac Banking Corp. v Bell Group Ltd. (in liq.) [No. 3] [2012] WASCA 157, 520 (Austl.) (“[D]irectors in discharging their fiduciary duties to their company must, if the company is sufficiently financially distressed, have regard and give proper effect to the interests of creditors.”); Moulin Glob. Eyecare Holdings Ltd. v. Mei, [2014] 17 H.K.C.F.A.R. 466, 485, 489–490 (C.F.I).(H.K.). For a review of the law post-Sequana see Rosemary Teele Langford & Ian Ramsay, The “Creditors’ Interests Duty”: When Does It Arise and What Does It Require?, 135 L.Q. REV. 385 (2019). As of this writing, Sequana is under appeal to the U.K. Supreme Court. The decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Cooper was reversed by the New Zealand Supreme Court but not with regard to the point made in the above quote. See Madsen-Ries v. Cooper [2020] NZSC 100 (N.Z.).
are to do more than merely give their mind to it, keep calm, and carry on. It is submitted that when this duty is enlivened, directors should shift corporate strategy to "survival mode"—that is, abandon any entrepreneurial strategy the company may have been pursuing and implement a custodial, caretaking strategy with a view to protecting the company’s core strategic assets. Such a strategy need not be similar to strategies that a liquidator could implement in order to sell the firm as a going concern. According to the present analysis, the purpose of such a creditor-considering duty is to help directors break out of the escalation of commitment trap by forcing a reconsideration of the business strategy in light of current circumstances. The purpose is not to make the company a "dead man walking"—namely, a not-yet-in-bankruptcy insolvent company that is nonetheless heading for bankruptcy. As long as the directors believe that there is a viable business strategy for the company, with creditors’ interest taken into account, they should be allowed to pursue it. Their discretion, however, may not be shielded by the protection of the business judgment rule. As argued above, when directors operate in the vicinity of insolvency, narrowly interpreted, they should become subject to a duty of caution or a close equivalent to that duty. Unlike the duty of care under the business judgment rule, the duty of caution is subject to substantive judicial review and intervention. Dicta in several cases are consistent with this view.

The second prong in the Anglo approach comprises statutory provisions that impose liability on directors of nearly, virtually, or practically insolvent companies for failing to take action in order to minimize the loss to creditors. Known as wrongful trading in British parlance, these statutes come under different titles and in different textual formulations. Their underlying logic has been contested and their track record in terms of achieving their purpose is subject to extensive debates, the discussion of which exceeds the present scope.

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110. See Moulin Global Eyecare Holdings Ltd. v. Mei [2014] 17 H.K.C.F.A.R. at 489 (C.F.I.) ("The duty may extend to not prejudicing the interests of creditors and preserving the assets of the company so that those assets may be dealt with in accordance with ordinary principles of insolvency law . . . .").

111. See, e.g., Westpac Banking Corp v Bell Group Ltd (in liq) [No. 3] [2012] WASCA 157, 520 (Austl.) ("[C]ourts will now intervene in an appropriate case, irrespective of the directors’ beliefs and business judgments, to ensure that creditors are properly protected.").


113. For scholarly analyses see, for example, Paul Davies, Directors’ Creditor-Regarding Duties in Respect of Trading Decisions Taken in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 301 (2006); Andrew Keay, Wrongful Trading: Problems and Proposals, 65 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 63 (2014); Jason Harris, Director Liability for Insolvent Trading: Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?, 23 AUSTL.
that these are the statutes that everybody loves to hate. So much so, that when the Covid-19 pandemic hit the world in 2020, the governments in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand passed laws to suspend these provisions for periods of several months—a move that is somewhat perplexing when one recalls that other sources of director liability, including the duty to consider creditors’ interest, remain intact.  

The theory advanced in this paper could help in rationalizing wrongful trading statutes. In this view, liability for wrongful trading should not aim to provide creditors with a direct cause of action against directors for the former’s losses; neither should it be viewed as a deterrent against taking excessive risks (“gambles”) with a view to shifting risk to creditors. An equally plausible rationale for these laws is to prod directors out of the escalation of commitment corral. This is particularly salient with regard to the Australian insolvent trading provision, to which a 2017 amendment added a set of safe harbors for directors that includes obtaining appropriate advice, keeping themselves informed of the financial position of the company, and maintaining proper financial records. These steps echo the mechanisms suggested in the escalation-of-commitment literature as means for de-escalation. They thus support an interpretation and implementation of the Australian statute, and possibly also its counterparts, as intended for achieving this goal.

Stated otherwise, wrongful trading liability could be imposed in legal systems that recognize this type of liability for failing to endeavor to replace an entrepreneurial strategy with a custodial strategy. It would not be imposed if directors took steps to address the situation. Despite textual challenges in the wording of those provisions, such liability could be assessed like a breach of trustees’ duty of caution and, consequently, without the immunity of the business judgment rule. Denying directors of the business judgment rule protection does not render wrongful trading liability strict, however. Like trustees, directors can still show that they


acted in good faith and reasonably in the circumstances, but their decisions would be subject to substantive judicial review. Much depends on courts’ understanding of the conundrum faced by managers of financially distressed companies. Judicial statements in this regard provide some comfort. In Singer v. Beckett (In re Continental Assurance Co of London PLC), Judge Park famously said that “[c]easing to trade and liquidating too soon can be stigmatised as the coward’s way out.” In Cooper, the Court of Appeal of New Zealand recently confirmed that “[d]irectors do not become liable under [section 135] simply because they continue trading after a company becomes insolvent.

Finally, the present theory could also provide a justification for the suspension of wrongful trading liability for a limited period after the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. The pandemic exerted a systemic shock to entire economies, the features of which could not have been foreseen. Inasmuch as financial distress and subsequent insolvency are related to the pandemic, there is scant basis to assume that they could have been avoided but for escalation of commitment by corporate leaders and their failure to de-escalate. The same cannot be said about the rationale from shifting risk, which is theoretically applicable also amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.

CONCLUSION

The legal zone in the vicinity of insolvency has attracted much attention from scholars and judges alike. That this zone exists as a matter of business reality cannot be denied. Many firms experience financial distress at certain stages of their operations; some overcome it and some don’t. Whether the condition of close proximity to insolvency should change the legal regime that applies to directors has received very different answers across common law jurisdictions, however. This paper advances a new account for motivating special legal treatment of fiduciary duties in the vicinity of

116. See supra note 63 with respect to substantive judicial review of professionals who handle risky situations. Arguably, there is a similar expertise in handling financially distressed firms that addresses protecting key assets, for instance—e.g., intellectual property or crucial locations—relieving debt burden, etc.
117. Singer v. Beckett (In re Continental Assurance Co. of London PLC) [2007] 2 BCLC 287 (Ch D) at [281] (Eng.).
119. One may wonder, however, if this logic does not also militate for suspending the common law duty to consider creditors’ interest in the vicinity of insolvency in the same circumstances. For a broader argument that bankruptcy proceedings are inappropriate for resolving Covid-19-related insolvencies, see Kristin van Zwieten, Horst Eidenmüller & Oren Sussman, Bail-Outs and Bail-Ins Are Better than Bankruptcy: A Comparative Assessment of Public Policy Responses to COVID-19 Distress, (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 535, 2020).
insolvency, in addition to the conventional account of risk shifting. This account points to escalation of commitment to motivate the imposition of a custodial duty of caution in the vicinity of insolvency. The analytical framework advanced in this Article can help in clarifying the law on this difficult subject.